

THE CASE OF ADVOCACY PLANNING: THE LIMITS OF PLURALISM
AS A BASIS FOR POLICY AND PLANNING PRACTICE

by

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Abstract

This thesis attempts to examine and explain the limitations of the outcomes of advocacy planning and to suggest ways through which these limitations can be overcome.

I examine the origins of, and describe advocacy as part of the 'community participation' movement, and as a particular manifestation of a professional movement disenchanted with traditional roles and concerned with bringing about social change and with redistributing equitably the resources in the city.

Further, I examine in detail the theory and practice of advocacy planning, through the issues that it deals with, its clients and constituencies, and its resources, especially the use of technical knowledge. I argue that it has adopted, explicitly or implicitly, the pluralist assumptions on the nature of our institutions and the action that is needed to change them.

These assumptions are analyzed and criticized in detail and are found inadequate as a basis for action to achieve social change. The limitations of the outcomes of advocacy projects are then explained by the adherence of advocacy to pluralist principles. I suggest an alternative analysis on which advocacy can base its practice to overcome its present limitations.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The subject of investigation of this thesis, and the method of investigation, stem from a particular desire. In choosing to discuss the advocacy planning movement I am not driven by purely academic interests, issues of strategy and of methodology. I am not interested in evaluating a particular mode of action in its own terms, or in suggesting ways to render it more efficient. I must admit from the outset that my interest, which is both academic and personal, lies in the desire to achieve social and economic equality, responsiveness of the social institutions, and a "better life". General as it is, this last concern achieves such a clarity and concreteness in the experience of our everyday life that any further definition is unnecessary for the purpose of this paper.

I have chosen to discuss the issue of advocacy planning because it, more than any other movement in the profession, explicitly attempts to confront the problem of inequality, quality of environment, and responsiveness of institutions directly. It has also been a movement that has established itself successfully and has served as a mode of action for many professionals in planning, who advocate social change as a means to achieve social justice.

Advocacy planning originated as a movement in the early sixties in response to professional and popular dissatisfaction

with traditional models of planning and their inability to cope with the growing problems of the cities. Advocacy, as I shall argue subsequently, adopted to a large extent, the pluralist model of social change, providing deprived interest groups with the resources needed (particularly technical resources) to compete in an assumed democratic process for the satisfaction of their interests and their improvement.

There are many angles from which one can approach the topic of pluralism and advocacy planning. Each one, to be comprehensive and exhaustive, would require the work of a dissertation in itself. Many papers have been written on this relatively new mode of professional practice, critical and complimentary. Most of this literature, however, deals with operational issues of the practice, attempting to define models of possible action and evaluate their effectiveness in dealing with concretely defined problems. Often this literature deals only with the methodological and operational problems of such an evaluation. Few studies, such as those of Frances Piven, have been written from a position removed from the immediacy and the detail of the problems that advocacy encounters in its practice and have attempted to present a total picture and a critique of advocacy. Such studies have stimulated heated and constructive and illuminating debate on both the actual function and the future of the practice.¹ The present paper, at the risk of being too general, falls in this last category,

and follows, hopefully not in a presumptuous manner, the reasoning of C. Wright Mills:

I can take a small portion of this very large topic and try to prove something about it in some detail; or I can take the whole topic and try to be merely provocative. I choose the latter. For one thing it is more fun; and for another, we ought to try to reason together.

My interest, therefore, is in evaluating the efficacy of advocacy planning as a possible model for the professional planner to affect social change. In order to do this, a theory is needed which will tell us what the nature of our social institutions is, and what is needed to change them. Although such a theory is not often made explicit, it is not absent from advocacy planning literature. Paul Davidoff, the first planner to formulate the model, related explicitly advocacy to pluralist theory. It may be argued here that advocacy planning is a myth; that it does not really exist as a coherent mode of professional practice, with its own structure and rules; and that whatever this practice is, it has no consistent explicit connection with pluralist theory. Rather, advocacy planning can be seen as a convenient name which can only describe the general mood of a period: a professional dissatisfaction with traditional modes of practice, an eagerness carried over from Civil Rights organizing to get directly involved with communities, an attempt to make planning more

political, a direct concern with problems of maldistribution and environmental quality. These concerns expressed themselves in a very moderate form, or in a very radical form and, conveniently, they were called "advocacy planning". But it is precisely for this reason that I am interested in advocacy planning. In its most general form it is a movement which carries with it certain values, is critical of certain conditions, and its concern is to achieve social change. The basic question that this paper asks is "how can such a movement be effective in its goals?". Advocacy planning has exhibited many inadequacies in pursuing its objectives.

I will attempt to show that much of the ineffectiveness of advocacy action can be explained by its adherence to a pluralist theory of social change, that is, by accepting the pluralist assumptions of what it takes to change our social institutions. In the next chapter I will explain the inadequacies of pluralist theory in its function as a model for achieving social change. Through this process, I am hoping to show the points that a truly adequate theory of social change has to account for.

In the third chapter I shall examine in greater detail the social forces, briefly outlined above, that made the general idea of advocacy planning acquire 'good currency'. Through this, I can more clearly define the concerns and the tasks of that movement. In the same chapter I will attempt to

show the connection of advocacy planning with pluralist theory. This I will do first, through an examination of theoretical writing that explicitly attempts to place advocacy planning on a pluralist basis; and second, through an examination of several issues in the practice of advocacy which, in the way they are resolved in that practice, exhibit the pluralist biases and assumptions about what is needed to achieve social change. This can lead to an understanding of the shortcomings of advocacy planning but more importantly, it is a model that can give us an alternative for overcoming those inadequacies. Through this criticism of advocacy I am hoping that I can develop a new set of assumptions on the nature of our social institutions which can serve as a guide for overcoming the shortcomings of the practice. What will hopefully emerge out of this process in the last chapter is a model on which we can build a typology of advocacy planning action. This typology will not be a result of a behavioral observation and evaluation based on statistical measure of the outcomes of such models, but rather it will be achieved through acquiring an insight into the nature of those problems that advocacy planning is facing, and the corresponding decision mechanisms that are needed or that must be altered for such a change to occur.

This does not mean that in the final chapter of this paper one will find a concrete model of advocacy which can be

applied successfully to our social ills. Far from it. The intention rather is to attempt to describe more clearly the tasks ahead and the structural changes that must be overcome for advocacy planning to achieve its objectives.

The Uses of Social Theory

The purpose of this paper is to attempt to answer the question: "Is pluralism proper for the creation and maintenance of a decent society?" To the extent that we are interested in pluralism in terms of its implications for social change we must judge it in terms of its effectiveness rather than in terms of its accuracy of description. If pluralism does not represent reality it is not necessarily rejectable or objectionable if the strategies and institutions that it prescribes would indeed lead to a desirable society. The fact, for example, that in American society, power is highly concentrated while pluralism prescribes competing interest groups is not necessarily or prima facie a point against pluralism. In discussing social change, therefore, pluralism stands on its capacity to implement itself and not on whether it is implemented in actuality. Pluralism, as most social theories, is an attempt to describe and explain reality. But as long as it also serves as a model of action, as a

means to achieving social change and a decent society, then we are interested in those aspects of it which are relevant to the use to which the theory is put. Whatever logic a certain social theory has it has a logic-in-use², that is it has a function in terms of what use it is put to. For example, an assertion such as that "American society is ruled by the democratic and decentralized mediation of competing interests" can be verified by its correspondence to social phenomena. Such an assertion also serves as a basis for justifying social action. If for example pluralism prescribes such a model of democratically competing interests for the achievement of a decent society and at the same time identifies this model in present reality, then the theory will be used to support and strengthen this reality. As long as the prescribed institutions do not lead to the desirable goals, this suggests not only that pluralism is inadequate, but also that the existing social institutions are inadequate, and that therefore, pluralism in its logic-in-use acquires a function which is detrimental to the establishment of a decent society.

The Prescriptive Aspect of Pluralism and Advocacy

Most social philosophies have an ideological content. They are prescriptions or justifications for certain kinds of social action, policy, or way of achieving certain goals.

In this ideological sense they appeal to the values that they project.

For example, the value or intent of classical liberalism as a way of describing reality can be contested. But not its function as an ideology, as a way of guiding action. It asserts that the unregulated pursuit by each individual of his own self-interest - the maximization of his utility - is a desirable social goal. The sanctity and freedom of the individual, social, political and economic, is a moral prerequisite, a goal of industrial society.

Similarly, advocacy planning is not just a strategy for achieving social equality for disaffected groups, but it also projects itself as a desirable goal as a model of a decent society. Each social philosophy in its logic-in-use exhibits the problem of the griffin hunt.³ Whether such a beast actually exists or not in social reality is immaterial to the evaluation of the theory in its prescriptive function.

Although, as we have said, a theory of social action should be investigated in terms of its logic-in-use, I shall make a few remarks in this introduction, however incomplete, about the prescriptive value of advocacy planning. The goodness and desirability of the prescriptive aspect of a theory constitutes a social force in itself, in its capacity to persuade practitioners (in our use planners and architects) and the public to adopt it on those grounds. Thus, Paul Davidoff claims that

the recommendation that city planners represent and plead the plans of many interest groups is founded upon the need to establish an effective urban democracy, one in which citizens may be able to play an active role in the process of deciding public policy. Appropriate policy in a democracy is determined through a process of political debate.⁴

The prescriptive aspect of advocacy planning displays the quality of being consistent with its use as a strategy, or a means, for achieving itself. That is, there is a consistency between means and ends. This quality is not unique. It is a prerequisite general characteristic of theories that attempt to justify either our existing order or a certain social policy or action. As we have said, such theories that deal with problems of decision-making are answerable to qualitative or value judgments. In attempting therefore to describe and to justify a particular mechanism of decision-making they must seek to compromise the result of this analysis with the values and the normative aspects of their content. The evaluation and selection of facts results in a political commitment. S. M. Lipset, for example, suggests that:

Democracy (i.e. the parliamentary democracies of the West) is not only or even primarily a means through which different groups can attain their ends or seek the good society; it is the good society itself in operation.⁵

It is very important to understand the distinction between the prescriptive value of a theory and its use as a

strategy for change. In the first case the theory has a utopian value whose appeal is based on its normative characteristics. Once this theory acquires a logic-in-use, i.e., identifies with a certain set of social institutions, its utopian value is completely transformed and acceptance of the theory as a basis for action cannot be justified anymore on its intrinsic prescriptive values.

Is the ideal model, prescribed by advocacy planning possible or desirable? In its prescriptive function the concept of pluralism in planning has attracted radicals and conservatives alike. Radicals particularly have been attracted to the concept of advocacy planning not only because they saw in it a possible means to social change (and perhaps the only possible one for professional planners and architects) but also because of the value it represents as a possible model to reorganize society. The appeal that it has for both radicals and conservatives is as a projection of a model of an ideal society. Advocacy planning is a viable alternative to the bureaucratic expansion of the Welfare State. It is the ideal of interest groups representing different interests, life styles, and cultures living together in harmony and tolerance with each other with adequate means and power ("resources") to control the decisions that affect them. Thus pluralism in its ideal form prescribes a model for a democratic distribution of power and satisfaction of interests. Posed as an ideal it

answers the demand for community control. The defense of the sanctity of the individual against a repressive state, expressed by classical liberalism and John Stuart Mill, is thus central to the pluralist thesis, but here, individual interest and autonomy is replaced by the group.⁶

There are several technical and substantive arguments against this model of group democracy. One of the technical criticisms is expressed by Mancur Olson.⁷ Olson develops and applies an "economic analysis" to the nature of aggregate choice and concludes that interest groups do not best represent the interests of their members. "Rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common 'group interests'", Olson argues.

(The view that) groups tend to further their interests is unjustified, at least when it is based, as it usually is, on the assumption that groups act in their self-interest because individuals do... Unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion...to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests.⁷

Another technical criticism was developed as a "law",⁸ "the iron law of oligarchy," by Robert Michels who argues that in any group, its leaders do not act in the interests of their constituency. Thus, a group will not function properly to the extent that it relegates and entrusts its interests to its leaders.

A third, substantive criticism argues that: a) the public is not properly socialized to make rational or 'good' decisions (as e.g. the Southern whites making decisions on race relations); and b) and most importantly, there is a conflict of interest among various groups, or between groups and the "public interest" which must be mediated on a centralized level (e.g., the State). "Is a neighborhood group to be allowed to veto a city plan which takes into account the needs of a wider and more inclusive social unit?"⁹ In this last criticism the question is reduced to the pragmatic, as well as the philosophical or moral consideration of "who should make, and at what levels of government, what kinds of decisions, for how large a social unit."¹⁰

This point bears further discussion. Many critics of advocacy planning and pluralism¹¹ have objected to the practice by arguing from a position of principle (prescriptive) that community groups do not have the capacity, or the interest, to develop plans that are compatible with the "public interest". The authority to make such decisions should be relegated to a group which is above local interests, an elite, which has the capacity, the knowledge, and therefore the moral right to make such decisions. Essentially, this position recognizes that a problem exists. Community groups are alienated from the decisions that affect them. This alienation however is viewed as a necessary evil; it is a sacrifice in the name of

efficiency and the goals that society pursues: i.e. the growth in material output.

The argument is that decisions are being made under the constraint of relative scarcity. It is an argument common to both vulgar Marxism and neoclassical economics, based on the economic or technological determinism of social relations. In this view the public interest is associated with the pursuit of the objective of increased productivity and material wealth. All social relations are essential to that objective.

In this view, then, alienation is a result of technological requirements and therefore demands for community control and advocacy planning are incompatible with the task of technological and industrial development.

Urban renewal projects, highway controversies, such as the Inner Belt in Boston, are all cases that demonstrate this point. (See Chapter 3). This last case, the Inner Belt, provides an extreme but illuminating example. M.I.T., in rejecting a proposed route along its campus, argued that the public interest and national security would be jeopardized by such a route:

Laboratories and research facilities which this so-called recommended route will destroy constitute a primary scientific arsenal of democracy in this gruelling struggle to maintain the balance of scientific power in the service of free man (who is threatened)...by those Communist powers that seek to crush us by moving ahead of us in scientific techniques.¹²

Such cases demonstrate quite clearly that the term "public interest" is ideological and not objective. That is, its logic-in-use reveals that it serves the interests of a particular segment of society rather than the general public.

Cases such as the Inner Belt are numerous. But they are not exhaustive. It could still be argued that on some level, alienation is necessary and that although some decisions are political still the hierarchical division of labor in society is necessary for its efficient reproduction and growth. This argument must be demystified.

Neoclassical economists, anthropologists, and other social scientists, to a large extent accept the materialist motivation of society as given, or natural. They subscribe to the formalist argument that states that in any society conditions of choice in a scarcity situation prevail and thus, efficiency, Pareto-optimality, even though they may be hidden, define the basis on which society is organized. Thus the process of constrained maximization is seen as a universal, a natural process. As Karl Polanyi, an opponent of this myth, states:

As regards man we were made to accept the heresy that his motives can be described as 'material' and 'ideal', and that the incentives on which everyday life is organized spring from the 'material' motives. Both utilitarian liberalism and popular Marxism favored such views. As regards society, the kindred doctrine was propounded that its institutions were 'determined' by the economic system...

Under a market-economy both assertions were, of course, true. But only under such an economy. In regard to the past, such a view was no more than an anachronism. In regard to the future, it was a mere prejudice.¹³

Accepting therefore the material interest as the natural, universal public interest, and consequently the social organization of a materialist order as natural or as a necessary evil is at least questionable. Further, the notion that even a market economy as we have known it - i.e. Western industrial society - is organized under the principle of efficiency and that therefore hierarchical and alienating organization is inevitable because it is essential to a high material standard of living, is also highly questionable.

Stephen Marglin, in a historical study¹⁴ claims that in the course of the development of capitalism hierarchical organization and

depriving the workers of control of product and process through (1) the development of the minute division of labor that characterized the putting-out system and (2) the development of the centralized organization that characterizes the factory-system, took place primarily (not) for reasons of technical superiority...(but) for guaranteeing to the entrepreneur the control of the production process and of accumulation¹⁵

If this is true then it becomes at least an open question whether or not the hierarchical order of decision making and alienated communities are essential to a high material standard of living. Other studies and experiments with alternative models of industrial organization have also indicated that increased productivity has little to do with the hierarchical division of labor and that organization on the basis of cooperative decision-making increases the productivity.¹⁶

Nevertheless technical decisions do exist. A society has to make such decisions relative to the goals that it has set for itself - such as overcoming scarcity.¹⁷ Such decisions are not value-free. They have implications for the people who are affected by them. The problem is how to structure such decisions to ensure that they remain technical and they are not used to impose the domination of one group over another, and further, so that people participate in the solution of a technical problem by which their own life is affected. If the problem is defined in this way, democracy vs. alienation becomes one of the values that a decision must maximize along with the one on economic growth.

A few societies have begun to deal with this problem of the planners and the planned. Examples can be drawn from the Israeli kibbutz where management rotates; the Chinese experiments in industrial organization under the Cultural Revolution, where technicians and management worked also as workers; or

from the proposals of Italian technicians and labor unions where labor and the technostructure make decisions collectively.¹⁸

In this respect, advocacy planning makes an important contribution to this problem. It argues - as opposed to traditional pluralist theory which shelves the issue of technical decisions as part of the political process with no intrinsic qualities of its own (See Chapter 3) - that interest groups should present their own plans reflecting their own interests in a technical situation. The role of the planner is seen as both an educator and an advocate of group interests. This process is recommended in its practice particularly for "community" groups but it could be seen as a viable model for organizing all decisions including those in the production process.

In its idealized form, then, advocacy planning appears as a viable model for organizing society.

But, as I shall argue in the following chapters, by identifying itself with existing political institutions and structures of decisions, it abandons the utopian and prescriptive appeal that it has. It becomes a strategy whose logic and efficacy can only be determined by the use to which the theory is put and the assumptions that it makes on the existing political process that it identifies with.

CHAPTER TWO: THE CONTEXT OF PLURALISM

In this section I shall present a model for decision-making that can serve as an adequate basis for evaluating the efficacy and the assumptions of pluralist theory and advocacy, and for a discussion of alternatives.

The objects of concern of a social theory are decisions. Such theories attempt to trace existing conditions to the corresponding decision-making processes. They evaluate and propose alternative processes (structures of decisions) compatible - in structure and results - with the normative goals set forth by that theory.

I shall assert that there are two kinds of decisions that shape our environment: institutionalized and political. The distinction is my own formulation of a distinction that is recognized throughout the planning and political theory literature under varying terminology. It is central to the determination of action that a theory recommends.¹

Robert Wolff in his critique of pluralism² distinguishes between the state of affairs or the events that are an object of one's (or a society's) decision and those that are not, or are consequences of one's decision but not (yet) objects of decision in themselves. Through this distinction Wolff defines "the law of the progress of rationality" as being the transformation into objects of decisions of matters which prev-

iously were not such objects. "Once any feature of the social world is known to be within human control, it is irrevocably an object of decision, so that even the failure to act with regard to it becomes a deliberate decision."³

Thus, according to Wolff, the "unintended consequence" - a major object of research by economists and social theorists - could be illustrated by the following example. Motorists make an individual decision to use their car to go in and out of town for work, entertainment, etc. The consequence of thousands of such individual decisions could be a traffic jam. The traffic jam itself is not an object of anyone's decision, it is in fact despised by all.

Further, Wolff distinguishes between "matters of little or no social importance and matters of major social importance." He claims that "the daily actions of an ordinary citizen are not, save under the most unusual circumstance, matters of major social importance, but the actions of the president are."

This is an arbitrary assertion. The example of the traffic jam itself shows that certain actions of individual citizens, taken collectively, are of major importance and determine - unintentionally - the environment.

The collectivity of such 'ordinary' actions I shall define as institutionalized decision processes. Such decisions are impersonal; they are not actually taken consciously. They are the result of our everyday life. They have to do with

income distribution, location of economic activity, the structure and development of communities, prices and wages, etc. They are the result of processes that have been institutionalized in our society and are therefore part of our immediate daily activity. Such processes in our society are economic, but not exclusively so. Specifically one could identify the following institutions:

- The private ownership and control of resources (land, labor and capital) and a free market through which the use and allocation of resources is regulated

- The privatization of consumption, so that essential or collective needs can only be satisfied through individual consumption of commodities; and

- The centralized control of the productive process by a bureaucracy or a management which represents the interests of capital.^{4,5}

Going back to the example of the traffic jam we can say that although each individual motorist makes a rational decision to use his car for a particular task, this decision is not made in a vacuum or a situation of maximum choice but it is to a large extent dictated by the availability or not of public transport, by the land use pattern of metropolitan areas, the optimum location of economic activities, the structure of neighborhoods, inconvenience in choosing one mode of transport over another, etc. We accept the institutional

constraints as natural, as given; we act rationally on that basis even if the collective result of such actions leads to irrationalities. In this sense therefore the daily actions of an ordinary citizen to the degree that they comply to the demands and requirements of major institutional and economic mechanisms through which society reproduces itself, are matters of major, perhaps the greatest, social importance.

The second type of decisions is political. These are the decisions we are directly confronted with, such as the war in Vietnam, adequate housing, minimum wage and welfare legislation, taxation, the determination of the supply of public goods, the transportation crisis, etc. In the Wolff model therefore political decisions are identical to the "events that are objects of one's - or a society's - decision". Such decisions are integrated into two basic processes: the legislative, and the administrative. The latter would include the city administration as well as the management of a corporation. Political decisions, that is decisions that result from political processes, are what we directly experience and therefore require our direct mediation. They require the explicit formulation of goals and strategies and resource allocations to achieve them.

Classical liberalism was of course the first political theory to identify the process of institutionalized decisions and to adopt it as a model around which a perfect society

should be organized. Adam Smith, for example claims that when the entrepreneur - the average citizen -

intends only his own gain... he is...led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention... By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it...The statesman, who should attempt to direct private people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals, would load himself with a most unnecessary attention.⁶

The political theory of classical liberalism responded to the ideological demands of the bourgeois revolution against the old repressive orders of the state and the church which were fetters to the productive forces contained in society. Thus any attempt of controlling the system of laissez faire, on imposing political, deliberate decisions on the economic, institutionalized mechanism was seen as detrimental to society. The "public good" would be taken care of automatically, through the "invisible hand".

Modern pluralism originated in response to the developments of western industrial societies, such as the increased role of the "Welfare State" in the regulation of the economy, productivity and affluence, an apparent decrease in political and ideological concerns, the emergence of the large corporation and the bureaucratic trade unions, totalitarianism, and other

phenomena which made classical liberalism obsolete as a description of reality, or as an ideology.

Interest Group Pluralism⁷

Pluralism, both as a theory and as a phenomenon, is particular to the United States due to the cultural, social and ethnic diversity of its immigrants and the structure of its government. Thus, apart from changes in the size and industrial organization of the modern state which made classical liberal democracy imperative there are certain factors specific in the American experience⁸ which argue for a pluralist explanation. A first factor is identified by Alexis de Tocqueville: "as the United States was colonized by men holding equal rank there is as yet no natural or permanent disagreement between the interests of its different inhabitants."⁹ Louis Hartz has developed this thesis further and has argued that the absence of feudal institutions in American has created both a relative equality of condition and a fundamental homogeneity in terms of class distinctions. There are no horizontal distinctions in American, which has a middle-class character. Or as de Tocqueville put it "though there are rich men, the class of rich men does not exist; for these rich individuals have no feelings or purposes, no traditions or hopes in common; there are individuals, there-

fore, but no definite class." ¹⁰ Interests divide society but not along class lines. Economic interest is only one in a set that would include all the diverse interests produced in a complex organization of industrialized society (farmers, industrialists, exporters, tenants, landlords, etc.) This view is reinforced by another factor particular to the U.S.: the impact of the American consciousness of its religious, ethnic and racial homogeneity, a factor which was also identified by de Tocqueville. ¹¹

Ethnic and religious agglomerations developed in the big cities which under the "melting pot" argument were seen as stepping stones for new immigrants to adapt in American society. These entities developed culturally and religiously and entered the political structure of American government. The interests of the members of such groups were represented by their leaders in local political processes. This process facilitated upward mobility and assimilation. Thus, both leaders and constituency would move into the national culture; the national politics, having to do with the greater public good, and the middle-class affluence.

A final factor is the often identified tendency to "deal with social problems by means of voluntary associations". ¹² Groups with particular interests join together in private associations and apply their resources to a variety of problems which they face. Ethnic and other minority groups constitute

examples of this. Political pressure groups and lobbies, special interests such as religion, art, life-style, charity, encompassing a large part of social activity have been organized on a voluntary basis. This has been reinforced by the traditional absence of an all powerful state, and the diffusion of power through a maze of state, city and local governments (formerly autonomous), judicial and executive bodies, etc. Power, therefore, such as this of the capitalist class, did not manifest itself in the State but was diffused throughout this system of government.

Although the above identified factors are present in U.S. society, it is debatable to what degree they dominate the decision-making process. In those however, pluralism owes its origins and much of its present form.

A large part of the assumptions of pluralism are based on a modern view of "rational" society, originating from Max Weber but developing and establishing itself in its modern form, in the fifties mostly, by leftist intellectuals. This view is best known as "the End of Ideology" thesis. It was first advanced in various meetings of the Congress for Cultural Freedom¹³ and later endorsed and developed by Daniel Bell and Seymour Martin Lipset.¹⁴ According to this thesis no more ideological conflict threatens to upset the existing social order. This view is based on a "technological determinism" interpretation of western advanced industrial societies.

First, affluence, and the great productivity of American economy had solved "the major problem of economic structure."¹⁵ Scarcity has been overcome. Society has the productive capacity to solve economic problems and the causes the economic classes to lose their ideological strength and their eagerness to revolutionize the social order. Second, a new elite, the "technostructure", has now taken the place of the old entrepreneurial elite, in the management of large corporations.

Thus, Lipset says,

the fundamental political problems of the industrial revolution have been solved....This very triumph of democratic social evolution in the West ends domestic politics for those intellectuals who must have ideologies or utopias to motivate them to social action.¹⁶

Or, according to Daniel Bell, "in the mass consumption economy all groups can easily acquire the outward badges of status and erase the visible demarcations."¹⁷

Changes in the structure of employment (service over manufacturing), and in the use of knowledge, both qualitative and quantitative have taken place. Technological knowledge is employed at a much larger scale than in previous societies in the making of decisions, and recent advances in theoretical knowledge central to the most important decisions in our society, to innovation and growth. Further, since the New Deal, the State, facilitated by the War and the Cold War

Ideology (a "mobilized society") has grown as a regulator of the economy and has penetrated and taken over decisions that were previously left to the market: "In Western Society", Bell says,

The dominant system has been property, guaranteed and safeguarded by the legal order....But over the last 25 to 50 years the property system has been breaking up... and changed in two distinctive ways. One, individual property has become corporate, and property is no longer controlled by owners but by managers.

The second change is the emergence of a new type of property, that which is controlled and dispensed by the State. Thus, according to this view, our economy is a "controlled economy".

In the next few decades, the political arena will become more decisive. If anything...we have become, for the first time, a national society, in which crucial decisions, affecting all parts of the society simultaneously are made by the government rather than through the market.¹⁸

Thus modern liberalism claims the supremacy of political decisions over what I have called the institutionalized ones, and this signals the end of radical politics. Since the economy has the capacity to solve problems, class and ideological struggle do not threaten anymore the social order. A general consensus about the rightness of the institutions prevails. Within the political decision making process technical

rationality is central and will soon dominate decision mechanisms. Within this framework which characterizes Western democracies, there is a consensus that each issue or problem that arises can and must be settled on its own individual terms, within the framework of a basically neutral "welfare state."

Beyond this framework, however, opinions diverge. Bell, for example, although he recognizes the political nature of certain decisions, ("do we want compensatory education for Negroes at the expense, say, of places for other students?"¹⁹), argues that ours is a "national society" in which decisions cut across group interest boundaries and have a national effect. Decisions therefore should be guided by "the public interest". This is made possible through the quantitative and qualitative changes and innovations in the methodology of social and hard sciences. Hence his notion that "experts know best" and his rejection of interest group theory on which pluralism is based.^{20,21} Pluralism however places technical knowledge and the professional reformer on a different basis.

Pluralism accepts the assumption that political decisions are autonomous and have replaced institutionalized mechanisms. It is not clear from the various writings whether this assumption is based on an interpretation similar to that of modern liberalism as I explained it above, i.e., a deterministic interpretation of "post-industrial", post-scarcity" society; or whether it is based on the claim that the particular nature

and structure of American society and its institutions give to the political sphere an autonomy over the economic sphere.

The major assertion, in any case, which I shall challenge in due course is that political decisions have replaced institutionalized ones.

In the pluralist model, modern developments have brought about a discontinuity between that which is socioeconomic and that which is political. Politics in the pluralist model ceases to be an epiphenomenon of socioeconomic life. Politics becomes autonomous as the number of autonomous and competing social units multiplies.²²

Or, as Dahl and Lindblom put it: "Socialism once stood for equality; but income and inheritance taxation, social security and other techniques of 'capitalist' reform have destroyed its distinction."²³

In economic organization and reform, the 'great issues' are no longer the great issues, if they ever were. It has become increasingly difficult for thoughtful men to find meaningful alternatives posed in the traditional choices between socialism and capitalism, planning and the free market, regulation and laissez faire, for they find their actual choices neither so simple nor as grand....At least in the Western World, most people neither can nor wish to experiment with the whole pattern of socioeconomic organization (corresponding to what I have called the institutionalized decision-making process) to attain goals more easily won. If

for example, taxation will serve the purpose, why 'abolish the wages system' to ameliorate income inequality?²⁴

There is therefore a one to one correspondence between this basic assumption of pluralism and the "end of ideology" thesis. But where the "end of ideology" thesis proposes a model of technocratic elitism in which the technostructure represents all interests in society and plans for the "public interest", interest-group pluralism proposes a model of "countervailing powers". It reverts back to the automatic model of classical liberalism. But now groups have taken the place of individuals. In the sense that pluralism rejects technical decision-making as synonymous to the public interest, it is antielitist. It demystifies "knowledge" and the technostructure. It recognizes that decisions are political, and must be mediated in a democratic process. But, like modern liberalism it avoids confronting directly the issue of values, by claiming that the pluralist process, like the market, is self-regulating.

Within this framework, the role of the state is ambiguously treated. The "referee" theory asserts that "the role of the central government is to lay down ground rules for conflict and competition among private associations and to employ its power to make sure that no major interest in the nation abuses its influence."²⁵ The "vector-sum" theory sees the Congress "as the focal point for the pressures exerted by

interest groups" by employing various resources, political or other. In either case the government is seen as central. It ratifies settlements and adjustments adjudicated among competing groups and it ensures access of such groups to the web of rules. Political power is widely distributed. Many groups share control of the state.

Political Participation

A fundamental presumption of pluralists according to Polsby is "that human behavior is governed in large by inertia. This notion leads pluralists to look upon overt activity as a more valid indication of involvement in issues than mere reputations of leadership."²⁶ Throughout his book, Dahl places emphasis on a distinction that he makes between homo civicus and homo politicus. These are innate personality characters, not influences by social, historical conditions. "Homo civicus is not by nature, a political animal."²⁷ Thus there is no possibility of learning anything from political apathy since it is treated as an innate human characteristic. However, in extreme circumstances, the pluralists would admit, homo civicus is awoken from his political apathy. This would occur when "civic" life is threatened by the "actions or inactions of governments." "But when the danger passes, homo civicus may usually be counted on to revert to his normal preoccupations with non-

political strategies for attaining his primary goals." ²⁸

These potentially mobilizeable attitudes exercise an effective stabilizing and restraining influence on the political system. Since pluralism assumes that the exercise of power is an overt activity, i.e., is observable, then political apathy is taken to indicate consensus rather than a belief in the futility of political activity.

Decisions are not hidden; they are directly observable. Pluralism therefore makes a strong methodological point that the question to be answered is not "who makes decisions?" but "does anyone make decisions at all?" and this can be answered through case studies of "important decisions". A failure to make a decision by some group or by homo civicus is not seen as a decision in itself. Truth is associated with what is directly observable and quantifiable. This methodological assumption is directly challenged by stratification theorists such as C. Wright Mills, who claims that power is visible only in crisis situations. Because of the general consensus that prevails, a power elite does not need to assert its power except when homo civicus is mobilized. A stratification theory therefore would concentrate not on the process of decision-making but on the existing distribution of potential sources of influence such as wealth, institutional position, etc. Conversely pluralism concentrates on the observation of the behavior of the actors; it is a "process" approach.

The Exercise of Power

To examine the distribution of power the pluralist researcher will concentrate on the exercise of power and not on its sources. As Polsby points out, to assume categorically that power exists in a community, and to ask "who runs this community?" instead of "Does anyone at all run this community?" is "somewhat like asking "Have you stopped beating your wife?" in that virtually any response short of total unwillingness to answer will supply the researchers with a "power elite".²⁹ For example, "if a man's major life work is banking, the pluralist presumes he will spend his time at the bank, and not in manipulating community decisions. This presumption holds until the banker's activities and participation indicate otherwise."³⁰

The obvious weakness of this assumption is that we cannot be sure that elements which are immeasurable or unobservable are not of decisive importance. It cannot explain why key issues have not been decided at all. Baratz and Bachrach criticize this approach of pluralism and attempt to put the stratification theory on an equal methodological basis with pluralism by using the concept of "mobilization of bias". This concept may not be objectively measurable but it is central to a discussion of power distribution.

By "mobilization of bias" they mean, "the dominant values and the political myths, rituals, and institutions

which tend to favor the vested interests of one or more groups, relative to others".³¹ There is a chance therefore that some person or group could limit the decision-making process to "relatively safe and non-controversial matters" by influencing community values and political procedures³² which should not be overlooked by the researcher.

Lowi makes a similar criticism of pluralist methodology by pointing out that Dahl in his model of decision making omits altogether one possible way of settlement of issues. In the resolution of conflict Dahl mentions three alternatives: deadlock, coercion, or peaceful adjustment. What is missing according to Lowi is the alternative of "peaceful coercion adjustment", a concept very similar to the "mobilization of bias."³³ These methodological biases of pluralist theory heavily prejudice both the selection and the results of their case studies.

Dahl's own arguments seem to support Baratz's and Bachrach's contention. He states that the pluralist process takes place within a consensus which is characterized by a belief in democratic institutions, and an assumption by most citizens "that the American political system is consistent with the democratic creed." This widespread adherence to the democratic creed is produced and maintained, according to Dahl, "by a variety of powerful social processes...(of which) probably formal schooling is the most important. The more formal

education an American has, the more democratic formulas he knows, expresses, and presumably believes".³⁴ The correlation of formal schooling with adherence to the democratic creed is not only peculiar but dangerous. First, it is dangerous because reserving democratic feelings only for the educated is a strongly ideological position which has no basis in fact. Second, it is dangerous to Dahl's own argument: Several studies have shown that the function of primary and secondary school education (and possibly higher education) is not the transmission of cognitive knowledge but socialization to the requirements of institutional roles that a particular social organization has a demand for.³⁵ Thus Dahl's statement would be correct if one replaced in it "democracy" with the particular requirements of "American democracy" and gives further credence to the Baratz-Bachrach argument.*

Further, the key political decisions that should be investigated in such case studies - however a pluralist chooses to define these, - according to Dahl "should involve actual disagreement in preferences among two or more groups. In short,

*Surprisingly, Dahl's view seems to be shared by Wolff who is a radical critic of pluralism. He claims that stratification theories are wrong and that the people do indeed have access to political power. If the policies by which they are ruled are evil - and he brings the example of the Vietnam war - they were indeed carried out with the consent of the public, which only proves that the public is "too stupid or too vicious" to react. (Wolff, op. cit., pp. 111-114).

the case of "indifference vs. preference should be ruled out." Preference, according to Dahl, is given. It is not something that can be manipulated and therefore it is outside the boundaries of a pluralist analysis. A power elite in this case would be a group whose preference prevailed regularly in key issues under evidence of existing opposition to the prevailing preference. The key issues which should be investigated are to be found in those matters that have been decided by someone against considerable opposition. Absence of opposition is seen as consensus.

Critique of Pluralist Assumptions

The major methodological error of pluralism however lies in its assumption that the important decisions are all made within the political sphere which supersedes the socioeconomic one. To use the very example of the banker that Polsby mentions, pluralism assumes that the banker's decisions should be investigated not in his capacity as a banker but in his involvement in overt political processes on key issues of the community. "As if banking were not a series of manipulations of community decisions perforce!"³⁷ There is a whole spectrum of key decisions that are being made outside the political process. Wolff thus claims that "the great corporations regularly make decisions whose consequences are of the utmost

social importance. These decisions, furthermore, are not subject to review by the general public, as are the decisions of elected or appointed officials." ³⁸ Not only are nonpolitical decisions of major social significance but they are of overriding importance. Such decisions, as I have already mentioned, would affect the location of activities and the availability of jobs, the level of incomes, prices, the availability of goods, the pollution of the environment, etc. Thus a deliberate political process such as collective bargaining is in itself constrained by the institutionalized decision mechanisms. Wages can be negotiated but only within the limits dictated by the economic system. These limits are not truly placed by private decisions of large corporations, for example, as Wolff claims. A large corporation, or the technostructure which allegedly directs its policies is in itself restricted by the demands of the institutions of competition, economic growth, expansion of the market, in short, accumulation. Even if one accepts then the possibility that corporate decision-making is in itself a political process subject to public review or to the inherent goodness of technical decisions-making, this does not necessarily mean that such decisions will be compatible with the "public interest". Management has the power to set prices but the power of their decision is limited by the institutional context in which they are made.

The role of the Welfare State is similarly a limited one. Thus, the economist J. E. Meade claims that whatever incomes policy may be initiated by the State it is bound to be very limited because of the constraints built into the economic institutions. A highly progressive taxation might solve problems of maldistribution. This however would "be bound to affect adversely incentives to work, save, innovate and take risks." 39 Although one may disagree with Meade's explicit correlation of material incentives with efficiency (cf. Chapter I, above) the basic assertion that institutionalized constraints limit the reform power of the State has been developed in a wealth of literature. 40

It is interesting to note that the limitations of this thesis are apparent even in Bell's argumentation. He argues for example, as we quoted above: "Do we want compensatory education for Negroes at the expense, say, of places for other students when the number of positions is limited?" (my underline). But by whom are these positions limited? Certainly not by a deliberate political process.

This is an argument that is overlooked by both pluralists, who claim that no restructuring of institutions is needed since demands can be satisfied by the existing pluralist process, and stratification theorists, who claim that a power elite or a ruling class controls the process and outcome of decision making, but it is not absent from the planning literature.

Roland L. Warren's remarks could serve as a summation of our thesis:

most purposive change... is a response to problems arising from the unplanned aggregate of individual decisions by persons, families, and organizations of one type or another as they pursue their interests and objectives. Such activity, in aggregate, is perceived as population increase or decrease or redistribution, either geographically or by sex-age category; or as "suburban growth", or "industrial growth" or "increasing automation"... Most of what is called "planned social change" is a relatively modest response to these larger changes which are taken as "given" and are not the result of concerted, deliberate, centralized decision-making. Unemployment insurance is instigated to meet the contingency of unemployment, rather than prevent it; city planning commissions take adaptive measures in view of such changes as population decline in the central city, suburban growth, new industrial location patterns, and the commuting phenomenon; social services are developed to help families whose individual lives dramatize the results of some of the larger changes.⁴¹

Thus Warren introduces another point: Purposive social change which is the object of politics and planning, in a society that is governed by institutional decisions, is always an afterthought. It deals with the consequences rather than the causes of problems. What politics deals with is not pursuit of explicit goals, but adequate compensation

for new problems which are created by industrial growth under the particular institutional organization of our society. Gintis calls this the "alienation of the state political apparatus" both historically and in recent developments. Historically, "the primary decisions which govern social development are made in the economic sphere...the State has no essential control over income distribution, work-activities, the development of community or technology." Further,

in recent years, the state apparatus has extended its sphere of influence even more directly into the economic realm, both as a direct employer, and as a dominant regulator of industrial activity. Here again, however, the state has no choice but to act as an appendage to the economic system.⁴²

A final argument that should be made is that the political process is not only an appendage to economic institutions but its primary function is as a corrective mechanism for the malfunction of institutional mechanism and as a means for expansion of the territory of economic activity. This argument challenges the view that the state plays a subordinate but basically neutral role. As Gintis claims, "the core institutions simply do not operate properly in their 'pure form' and it is the function of the state to correct malfunctions."⁴³

Gintis gives the example of child labor laws and factory safety legislation which were "important to the generation of an adequate labor force" in the first steps of industrialization. More recently, welfare programs, zoning, and highway programs

can be analyzed as "perfecting and stabilizing rather than undermining the operation of core economic institutions."

Much has been written about the real purpose of governmental reform and its function as a stabilizing and perfecting mechanism, some particularly relevant to the planning field.*

Theodore Lowi tabulates a number of selected public policies, by degree of "likelihood of significant social change" and "degree of government involvement." The results are that public policies which exhibit a high degree of government involvement and which call for significant social change are quite infrequent. "This particular look at government,"

*Frances Piven and Richard Cloward in Regulating the Poor, Pantheon, New York, 1971, investigate historically the function of welfare programs. Robert Goodman in his recent After the Planners, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1972, documents the loyalty of the government to business interests in their attack on the urban crisis, the highway programs, work training programs, etc. Baran and Sweezy, op.cit. develop the theme of the function of the state in the accumulation process by its role in the absorption of surplus, and the consequences that this entails for the urban condition. Barton J. Bernstein in his "The New Deal: The Conservative Achievements of Liberal Reform" in Bernstein (ed): Towards a New Past, Vintage, New York, 1969 documents just that. For a documentation of the role of the U.S. Government in the field of socialized housing see Michael Stone, "The Political Economy of U.S. Housing" in Upstart, no. 3, Winter, 1971. For a general theory of the state cf. Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society, Basic Books, New York, 1969 and Georges Poulantzas Pouvoir Politique et classes sociales Maspero, Paris, 1969.

Lowi claims, "should be most unsettling to liberals and especially to Negro leaders, who, socialized by white liberals, have assumed that political power is all that one needs in order to achieve important humanitarian goals."⁴⁴

Related to this view of the state is the question of whether the economy has enough slack to allow for government subsidization of solutions to public needs such as housing, public transportation, elimination of slums; and unemployment; or whether the government by satisfying public needs can also satisfy the institutional requirements placed upon it. Much has been written on this subject.⁴⁵ Sweden, South Africa, and Great Britain, among other nations, have in varying degrees provided successfully socialized services such as housing and medicine. So it is argued that even though the state may be a servant of powerful economic interests it can serve those interests by satisfying public needs. Such a question cannot be resolved one way or another in a general level. It must be left open and reexamined in concrete situations.

The Logic-in-Use of Pluralism

The point that institutionalized decisions override political ones must be further clarified: There are several reasons why both political theorists and the general public often adhere to the stratification model and the power elite even though the (political) decisions of such an elite are

subordinate, as I have argued, to institutionalized constraints - and, therefore, even if the power elite had good intentions it would be unable to implement its programs. As Wolff has claimed the adherents to the power elite theory are wrong but for the right reasons. That, is, they object to the results of institutionalized decisions. But the only way that the very structure of decision making can change and either be relegated to the political sphere or to new, less objectionable institutions, is through purposive action - that is, through politics. Therefore, although politics in its present form is an appendage to economic institutions, it is also "the midwife of history". But if the current political practice claims for itself all possible alternative for political action and refuses to challenge the structure of institutions, this is taken in itself to be a political decision and as Bachrach and Baratz have argued (cf. above) it is part of what constitutes political power.

Further, the political sphere (e.g., the Welfare State) makes promises that cannot be kept. It claims that social problems can be solved through it. When it fails to do so the expecting citizen will ask "why hasn't the state delivered the services that I rightfully demand?"⁴⁶ This absence in the improvement of the delivery of services then is seen as a deliberate policy on the part of a power elite. But the political process claims, that, in its present form, it covers

the full range of alternatives, in order to preserve itself.

I have presented above a criticism of some assumptions and biases of pluralist theory. These biases however are not simply shortcomings or methodological errors of the theory. They are ideological arguments, central to the theory and to its logic-in-use.

Under this logic, pluralism discourages a certain kind of politics in favor of the existing process. It serves an integrative function, in placing all demands, claims, and interests in a process that requires them to be rational and to be resolved rationally.

This particular function of pluralism can be found in many of its principles. In the particular emphasis that it places on governmental decisions and political mechanisms of decisions-making, to the exclusion of any consideration of institutional mechanisms, it tends to prejudice the nature of our problems and what is needed to solve them. It obscures issues and divisions in society that are a direct result of the functioning of economic institutions. Thus, this view challenges the traditional Marxist approach to social conflict as stemming from socioeconomic mechanisms do not govern decisions anymore. Basic conflict, resulting from the normal reproductive function of institutional mechanisms, is not recognized by the theory. What is recognized instead is vertical divisions in society, a multitude of particular

interests and sets of problems, seemingly unrelated to each other. They cannot be predicted by a social theory to the extent that this theory looks for their causes in the function of socioeconomic institutions. But they can be predicted by behavioral sciences to the extent that these sciences give a psychoanalytic interpretation to social behavior.

This function of pluralism is reinforced by the views held towards radical or mass movements, towards apathy and tolerance and towards "rationality".⁴⁸

In the first place, the assumption that political decisions override institutional ones whether because all major economic problems have been solved or because the political sphere is autonomous and can satisfy all demands and that therefore no moralistic or ideological conflict is valid, since all demands can be met through the existing system, discredits as irrational radical movements which call for major structural changes, or which present their demands outside the normal pluralist institutions. If the general assumption is that our society has the procedural and material capability to solve problems, than obviously any failure to translate needs to specific demands within the web of rules, and any attempt to radically restructure those rules, is seen as irrational and wrong. The pluralist interpretation of apathy and non-participation as consensus is brought as evidence that indeed this is the general assumption shared by the public as a whole. Further,

political apathy and non-involvement are seen as evidence that the pluralist system works.

The pluralist assumption that a rational demand is one that can be satisfied within the framework of the existing social order further reinforces the conservative logic-in-use of the theory. It is argued that in a pluralist framework rational demands can be satisfied. But rational according to the theory is identified with the instrumental pursuit of one's self-interest. Thus, if demands are to be satisfied they must be presented instrumentally, translated into concrete goals which can be satisfied. No rational group or individual would pursue goals which could not be satisfied. Utopianism is excluded through the definition of instrumentality. The case of satisfaction of demands is thus predetermined. As Bell argues, the danger "is that political debate moves from specific interest clashes, in which issues can be identified and possibly compromised, to ideological tinged conflicts that polarize the groups and divide society."⁴⁹

The reliance of pluralism on groups as mediating mechanisms for the resolution of conflict is seen by Rogin and Wolff as a function of the theory linked to the tradition of Durkheim and Talcott Parsons. In this view, for the modern pluralists

a constitutional regime requires
'traditions of civility' that
tolerate a variety of interests,
traditions, life-styles, religions,
political beliefs, and economic

activities. This diversity is safeguarded when power is shared among numerous groups and institutions. Groups provide individuals with specific channels for realizing their demands, focusing their members on the practical desires that can be realized in ordinary democratic politics.⁵⁰

Pluralism assumes that groups are homogeneous, democratic and are characterized by elite leadership. Leadership is central to the pluralist thesis:

In any durable association of more than a handful of individuals, typically a relatively small proportion of the people exercises relatively great influence over all the important choices bearing on the life of the associationThese persons are, by definition, the leaders.⁵¹

Leaders fall in the category of homo politicus. Their power is derived by a natural desire and reward from getting involved into the political process. Although their power is unequal, it is "non-cumulative".⁵² This elite leadership is characterized by a democratic relationship to its constituency - the homo civicus." Both the consensus on the "American democratic creed" and the "ease with which the political stratum can be penetrated whenever dissatisfaction builds up in some segment" of the constituency act as incentives for the elite to be representative of group interests and to be checked by their members.⁵³ But elites perform a much more vital function than just representing group interest. In their turn, leaders check members. They have the capacity to translate desires

to rational demands, they are better informed than their constituents; in sum "for the pluralists, leaders are more likely to be socialized into the dominant values and established institutions of their society."⁵⁴ Assuming that the pluralist political process is slack, and has the capacity to solve all problems presented to it then the role of the elite leadership certainly seems to be a rational one. Community values can be translated into operational and concrete technical and political goals, into plans and "counterplans" mediated in a rational process.

Demands that deal with direct democratic political control of all major decisions that affect the quality or work, of environment, of community, of material equality and satisfaction cannot be dealt with in the pluralist system since that control does not belong to the political sphere.

If the pluralist assumption that political decision mechanisms have displaced institutionalized decisions and that therefore all issues can be resolved within the political process, is true, then rationality is a value equated with the proper function of this political process. Discontented people would be irrational if they did not play the rules.

The particular role of the elites and of the techno-structure is important in this process. The elite is seen as a group, properly socialized into the values of society, that has the knowledge and the technical and political capacity to

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translate values, and "moralistic" goals.

This role is not conservative in itself. But, in the light of other pluralist assumptions, it becomes the principal mechanism of cooptation of values that are potentially detrimental to the pluralist order. Further, because of the central position that it occupies in the pluralist model it is the principal mechanism of integration and consensus. The importance of this mechanism in American history - e.g. in the labor union and civil rights movement - cannot be overemphasized.

The translation of values into concrete rational demands is related to the pluralist assumption that the exercise of power is observable, and to the consequent emphasis on behavioral observation and case studies. This implies that the resolution of conflict in a particular controversy that may have arisen, can come about by treating the case in an isolated manner. It preempts the possibility that concerted action is needed on another level, that the problem is structural and cannot be treated ahistorically. It reinforces the view that ideology is obsolete and that all that is needed for an adequate expression of the problem and for the manipulation of political actions, the exercise of power, is technical knowledge.

In summary, pluralism, in its logic-in-use performs several conservative functions. It reverts back to elitism, it obscures the real nature of social problems and therefore excludes certain types of action which is possibly necessary.

It performs an integrating function and acts as a valve for the legitimation of demands, issues, and groups and the exclusion of others. The latter functions are not conservative in themselves but they become so if they are used to preserve political structures, and integrate groups within them, that are incapable of satisfying demands made upon them.

CHAPTER THREE: CONTEXT AND EMERGENCE OF ADVOCACY

A number of factors contributed to the emergence of advocacy planning in the early sixties. These include the deteriorating quality of U.S. inner cities; the professional disappointment with traditional forms of practice; the civil rights movement, urban riots and unrest; the War on Poverty; the professionalization of reform; the fiscal and bureaucratic problems of city and federal administration. In order for advocacy planning to be properly understood, a brief exposition of these factors and of their interrelationships is in order.

The Context as a Consequence of Institutional Mechanisms

The crisis of the sixties was brought about by problems that are consequences of institutional mechanisms of decision-making. One of the major problems was migration to the cities and the subsequent population explosion. Nineteenth century European immigrants located close to the center of cities, near industry and jobs. When they became better off they moved out of the city while new migrants took their place in a filtering process. There were always closed working class quarters in cities but these were usually ethnic agglomerations and not ghettos in the sense that they developed with the mid-twentieth century migration of blacks from the South. The roots

of the present crisis lie with the transformation of Southern agriculture. Introduction of new technology eliminated the sharecropping system and hand labor. Many of the displaced blacks moved to the North. This process of migration was facilitated by the jobs provided by the war industries in the two wars, particularly World War II, and the expanded production of consumer goods. The large migration of the fifties however, was caused largely by the decisive transformation of Southern agriculture, which resulted in a huge decline in use of labor. The migrants of the sixties however were faced with a different situation. Jobs were not readily available to them both because of a slow-down in national economic growth and their lack of skill - which during the war was overcome by the cost-plus production. Further, increased application of automation and the decentralization of economic expansion and employment to the periphery of metropolitan areas contributed to the problem. Segregated suburbs kept blacks away from jobs. But this is not all. The technological contribution to the decentralization of cities, to the structure of employment and to housing is a major factor in the current crisis. Motor transportation and the spread of automobile use made it possible for industries to locate away from the central cities where more land is available at a lower tax rate.

The better-off classes, pushed out by increased city poverty, deteriorating quality of services and black migration

followed a similar pattern. This was facilitated by various government programs such as housing subsidies - V.A. and FHA loans and FNMA subsidies - and federal highway programs.

As a result of this, human and material resources, educational, capital, and services, were drained from the inner city. Absentee ownership of housing and the lack of upkeep by owners who refuse to replace depreciation, thus withdrawing their capital while still maintaining a steady income from high rents, led to rapid physical deterioration, accentuated by overcrowding conditions, caused both by lack of housing and increase in population through a high birth rate among blacks and a reduced mortality rate. The physical deterioration of the inner city and the flight of industry and the middle class in the suburbs precipitated the final crisis of the city which was thus unable to deal with increased demands for services.

The deterioration and perpetuation of ghettos is explained both by a circular causation argument and by a domestic colonialism argument. According to the second argument, the ghetto is "an area or a reserve of labor whose lower incomes are somehow necessary to, and agreed upon by, white society.¹

According to the first argument the conditions of life in a poor community tend to reinforce and preserve poverty

Low incomes are the result of low productivity, which is promoted in turn by poor diet and poor health... low incomes mean crowded and unsanitary housing, which leads to bad health and low productivity.²

The same argument can be made about crime, credit, education, and the culture of poverty. This last topic has been much discussed. Social scientists such as Moynihan and Banfield attribute the ghetto stagnation to cultural reasons such as the lack of motivation and middle class aspirations, thus rejecting economic factors. Others such as Liebow and Silberman claim that ghetto residents

Precisely because they have been acculturated into middle-class values, their inability to climb out of the lower class slum persuades them that the cards are stacked against them.³

In any case ghetto poverty is accompanied by social and cultural problems such as increased delinquency and crime rate, breakup of families and an "irregular" ghetto economy.

Conditions as Results of Political Mechanisms

The attempts of federal and local governments to remedy the situation only aggravated the problems. The legislature through the Urban Program (Title I of Housing Act of 1949) attempted to eliminate slums and halt the deterioration of the inner city, to recapture the inner city for the middle class and to increase the tax base. The implication of the act was that the social conditions were a result of the physical deterioration of the environment and that elimination of the slums would consequently eliminate social problems. This

assumption of causality was wrong and social scientists like Herbert Gans, Lee Rainwater, Marc Fried, and Peggy Gleicher, argued that the slum environment often has the opposite function, i.e. to provide a basis for the residents to cope and deal with the problems facing them.

Of course this assumption was not only erroneous but it also served as a justification for the suburban interests to recapture the inner city. Businesses that require face to face contact, educational and governmental institutions never lost interest in the inner city. Their claims for expansion and upgrading were followed by sectors of the middle class who were attracted by downtown institutional opportunities and were harassed by increased commuting efforts. The only possibility of recapturing the lost territory was on a vast scale, through eminent domain and with the use of federal funds that Urban Renewal provided.⁴

In practice urban renewal did what it was supposed to do. It provided a way "of taking land from old users, and selling it in large quantities to new ones, at a much lower price than would otherwise prevail."⁵ The net effect has been to lower the price of evicting the poor. Further, by reducing the supply of low-income housing, it has caused rents to rise:

Criticism of urban renewal has often been limited to its failure to find vacant apartments for the specific families evicted. But even if the relocation agencies do function for these individuals, the net effect on low income families is adverse.⁶

Thus, the Douglas Commission has shown that until 1967, almost 400,000 mostly low-income housing units were demolished in urban renewal areas while 107,000 units were built in their place, a very small percentage of which was low income housing. 7

Thus the destruction of viable communities, the identification of the program with "Negro Removal" and the lag in the provision of the promised low rent housing units - the 1949 act had promised 810,000 public-housing units in a six year period - precipitated criticism of the program and contributed to the urban unrest.

The federal highways program, which sought to remedy the problem of commuting by carving highways out of those same inner city neighborhoods, helped to precipitate the crisis.

Such political responses to the crisis contributed to the insight that the political institutions and their programs were not there to help alleviate the problems but to serve dominant interests and to contribute to the intensification of the problem.

The crisis was accompanied by a breakdown of the pluralist process in the city. Traditionally, voluntary associations were capable of dealing with the demands of their constituencies. Civic, service and fraternal, and neighborhood associations were functional in integrating, providing jobs, services and information, patronage and protection for poor and ethnic groups. But, as I mentioned above the new conditions of the

inner city made this process obsolete and the poor felt alienated from the existing political and cultural organization of the city.

The Professional Contradictions

In this context, the traditional modes of practice for the professions of architecture and planning seemed incapable of dealing with the crucial issues facing them. Every profession is built on an ethos that justifies its existence and practice in terms of normative goals that it pursues, and on a social function defined largely by the demands of institutional decision mechanisms. The concerns of the architect that are based on the ethos of the profession, in a sense, run contrary to the demands that institutional mechanisms place on the environment. If the former have to do with the quality of the physical environment, the latter are concerned with the efficiency of the allocation of resources and with private ownership and control. Thus architecture was seen as irrelevant to the demands of the reproduction of economic institutions and was pushed to the margins of productive activity. Less than twenty per cent of the building activity of the country went through an architect. The profession had to contend itself with the "private concerns", as Mills called them: the concerns of those rich enough to afford architectural services and to employ the architect for their own interests. The primary

function of the architect was that of the decorator: "beautifying the milieu of the rich and polishing up the face of the corporation."⁸

The professional action based on the ethos of architecture of planning has the potential of becoming an independent force and of challenging the institutional structure that constrains it. Architects, and the AIA have always been aware of the institutional constraints on the profession. The utopian tradition - exemplified for example in the writings of Jane Jacobs - has always been strong. Thus a report of an AIA committee "On the Future of the Profession", published in the AIA Journal⁹ admits that the "constraints - economic, political, technological - are numerous, but if they can be minimized the problems can be solved". But the AIA and the profession never really attempted to understand the nature of those constraints and the action that is needed to overcome them. Instead, it called for the generation of "creative programs" and partnerships with the "enlightened" developers. At other times the AIA, finding itself having to protect both the ethos and the shaky position of the architect in society attempted to abandon any pretense of acting according to a professional ethos.

Perhaps the only realistic course is to adopt a plan which depends neither on custom nor conscience but on human dignity alone. It is the adoption of an unwritten code which antedates the French and American Revolutions, the principle of noblesse oblige...

Like noble breeding (architecture's) inherent lineage presupposes a deep moral obligation to preserve its high standards; and its future lies not in the architects' collective conscience but with the respect in which architects hold themselves and their colleagues.¹⁰

Whether the professional organizations are set up and capable to pursue demands springing from the professional ethos is open to question. The AIA has attempted to enlarge the role of the architect for the dual purpose of expanding the base of a faltering professional activity and or appearing as relevant to the problems of today. Eagerly and indiscriminately the AIA adopted and encouraged new techniques and new roles: from civic design to urban design, fallout shelters, systems and methodology, participatory design and pollution ("visual pollution is deadly too"¹¹), even the student protest. It supported and joined the governmental programs that were presented as solutions to the urban crisis. However, the state often failed to reciprocate support:

Despite the stress on innovation, however, HUD in the early days of its Model Cities program failed to call on the doers, including the architects. Yet when it comes time to implement plans, the doers are turned to and the doers sometimes find the plans unworkable.¹²

But in whatever program the architect did participate, such as in the Urban Renewal Projects, the performance of

the programs did not enhance the professional ethos.*

Young and critical architects therefore found themselves in a precarious situation. On the one hand, trained by elite schools to see themselves as having much control over the environment, they found their role in society expendable. Further, they discovered that the few jobs that awaited them hardly presented them with any initiative in the design process, but rather they were asked to serve as "workers" in a highly structured hierarchical professional organization. On the other hand, faced with the urban crisis and the demands that powerless groups were making on professionals and reformers, architects found that the traditional roles were subservient to powerful interests.

Similarly in the planning profession, the limitations of the traditional structure and preoccupations were a cause for the search of alternatives.

As I have noted in the previous chapter, the role of the technostucture and specifically of the planner is a peculiar one.

*In the last year the American Institute of Architects has been instrumental in establishing Community Design Centers throughout the country and in lobbying for the OEO Bill (section: Community Design and Planning Assistance) currently before the Congress which will provide funding for the involvement of architects in such centers. The Bill "recognizes that persons living in urban and rural poverty areas must have improved access to professional architectural, planning, engineering and related design services in order to participate more effectively in the planning and development of the physical environment of their communities....The program...would make design and planning services relating to housing, neighborhood facilities, transportation and other aspects of community-based design and planning organizations staffed primarily by professional persons and community residents on a voluntary basis.13

That technicians, administrators and planners have risen to directing posts in the economy, political institutions, and public authorities, and that the role of such institutions has become more central in society, is true. But to what extent they have been able to assert their autonomy in decisions and to what extent technical decisions carry with them a new "scientific morality", as Melvin Webber has suggested, is at best arguable.

The traditional view of planning legitimized its practice largely through the acceptance of the model of technical decision-making exemplified by the end of ideology thesis. Several views have been presented on the domain and the practice of planning. Professionals have argued for disjointed incrementalism (Lindblom) versus comprehensive planning (Davidoff and Reiner), which is often used synonymously with social planning, functional planning, process planning, technical and authoritative planning etc. Within those often conflicting definitions of the profession certain assumptions are common.

If one takes planning to mean the purposive use and allocation of resources - means - for achieving a certain project - end - consistent with a set of explicit values then there is very little or no planning activity to speak of in this country. Comprehensive planning is the direct opposite of institutionalized decision-making. As Stephen Cohen has argued :

a (general resource allocation) plan suggests that shaping the future society passes from a process of causation to a process of decision. At present (in a market system) the direction of development is 'caused'; it is not decided....Pragmatic (planning) enters the causation process in disjointed, piecemeal fashion to temper and to stir it a bit. But it does not substitute an alternative process of deliberate decision for the present process of unplanned causation.¹⁴

A change, from causation to decision, implies in substance (in incomes, profits, prestige, freedom, power, etc.) and (therefore) it is not likely to happen without a prior, enabling change in substance.¹⁵

The planning profession is thus facing a serious contradiction: the need to expand purposive action to encompass all areas of human need, based on explicit goals, while its action is seriously restricted by institutional constraints. Under a social system where major decisions are dictated by institutionalized mechanisms, the values inherent in the process of planning cannot be made explicit and thus the function of planning as purposive action is limited.

By this definition, planning is political and values are central to it. But by operating under the cloak of scientific objectivity planners have pushed aside the issue of values and the institutional limitations of the profession.

Dissent in the planning profession therefore stems from two related facts. First, there is a discrepancy between the alleged power that a planner has to implement his technical

decisions and the actual power he finds lacking in the performance of his function. Second, technical and planning decisions are not value-free but are directly political, and the planner discovers that the practice based on scientific objectivity has in fact been used in a biased way in the past.

The forces therefore which helped bring forward advocacy planning as an alternative were: (a) The deteriorating conditions, physical, economic and social of the inner city. These conditions, I have argued, were a result of, or were caused by, the particular economic institutions that our society has adopted; (b) the insight that political corrective mechanisms were aggravating the situation; (c) the resulting sense of alienation from political institutions and the consequent protest movement and the plight of blacks and the poor, in the cities and the South; and (d) the disillusionment with traditional modes of practice both in their efficacy to solve the problems at hand and, equally important, in the satisfaction of professional values, and professional aspirations in terms of the availability, and quality, and scope of jobs.

These concerns were more or less common to most professions and underlined the unrest of the sixties. Traditional practices and assumptions could not account for the new concerns and realizations.

From this crisis in the professions, and from the examples set by other movements such as the Civil Rights Movement

and the attempts to organize poor communities, such as Alinsky's, advocacy emerged as an alternative. This practice became common in law, social services, psychiatry, medicine and planning and architecture.

The Pluralist View of Advocacy Planning

Dissenting professionals and advocacy planners challenged directly the nonpolitical position of the profession and saw its limitations as a force for social change. Thus Davidoff writes:

City planning in the United States has reflected the culture of which it is a part. It has been used to support the economic growth and to maintain the present distribution of opportunities and of goods and services. Because the present distribution of such things as wealth, income, education, and health is unequal, city planning has supported the maintenance of such inequalities. Zoning and urban renewal have been used as a means of preserving the separation of income classes and social groups. Planning has been employed for the purposes of maintaining segregated housing and segregated schools.¹⁶

This has been the result of the uncritical and neutral stance of the planner. But as Davidoff correctly points out:

"appropriate planning action cannot be prescribed from a position of value neutrality, for prescriptions are based on
17
desired objectives.

As we have already shown, pluralist theorists take a similar stance with respect to the role of technical knowledge. They treat it as part of the political process. Dahl for example, uses the terms "professional", "technician" and "politician" interchangeably, suggesting the political nature of technical decisions:

Although politicians make use of information about the world around them, and hence depend on 'scientific' or empirical elements, the actual practice of politics by a skilled professional is scarcely equivalent to the activities of an experimental physicist or biologist in a laboratory....His knowledge is highly imperfect. He cannot be sure at what point rival professionals will begin to mobilize new resources against his policies....He may lose his popularity...

According to Dahl, a professional or a politician uses the skills at his disposal politically; that is, "depending on the forces that generate needs for approval, popularity, domination, manipulation, deception, candor and so on." Dahl argued that in a pluralistic system these forces were countervailing.

Davidoff argues that the process outlined by Dahl above does not function properly anymore. One of the major reasons for this is the emergence of the Public Planning Commission which

has separated planning from local politics (and) has made it difficult for independent commissions to garner influential political support. The commissions are not responsible directly to the electorate and in turn the electorate is, at best, often indifferent to the planning commission.¹⁹

As a result of this the planning process and the delivery of services and programs becomes unresponsive to the needs of constituencies. To correct this and to pave the way for a "pluralist" and "effective" urban democracy, advocacy planners suggest that the function of the planner must again be politicized. The basic assumption of this approach is that the pluralist political system is basically adequate for dealing with the issues that confront us but it is malfunctioning. The ills of the cities are a result of this malfunctioning. By treating the planning process as nonpolitical, debate and countervailing powers fail to influence decisions. Some interest groups have monopolized the use of the skills of professionals. Planning and technical decisions are not politically neutral. Further, they are not anymore the neutral outcome of countervailing political interests as Dahl once claimed.

The remedy, according to advocacy planning is for the planning process to become explicitly political. This suggestion goes beyond Dahl's model which asserts that a professional will decide on the basis of countervailing powers according to his own intuition: Each group interest should now be explicitly

represented in the planning process. It should have the capacity and power to present its own plans or counterplans which will then be mediated in a balanced pluralist process. To paraphrase Dahl, advocacy planners suggest that "rival professionals must begin to mobilize new resources against government policies."

Advocacy planning is then seen as a corrective mechanism for the pluralist process. Because of this function advocacy rejects the claim of pluralists that no values need to be made explicit and that, as in a market situation, all interests are satisfied automatically, through an "invisible hand". Davidoff, for example, claims that:

Pluralism and advocacy are means for stimulating consideration of future conditions by all groups in society. But there is one social group which at present is particularly in need of the assistance of planners. This group includes organizations representing low-income families. At a time when concern for the condition of the poor finds institutionalization in community action programs, it would be appropriate for the planners concerned with such groups to find means to plan with them. The plans prepared for these groups would seek to combat poverty...²⁰

Thus advocacy planning, although it is posed as a model for the society as a whole, at present calls for partisan action on the side of the needy groups.

The major point of Davidoff's thesis is that the political mechanism is malfunctioning. Political decisions - to which

planning is central - are not anymore mediated through a pluralistic process. He criticizes the current practice of comprehensive planning and the "unitary plan". He calls for the deliberate politicalization of planning to enhance the pluralist process of decision making. Davidoff appeals to the prescriptive aspects of advocacy and pluralist theory. Thus he asserts that

Determinations of what serves the public interest, in a society containing many diverse interest groups, are almost always of a highly contentious nature. In performing its role of prescribing courses of action leading to future desired states, the planning profession must engage itself thoroughly and openly in the contention surrounding political determination.²¹

This however assumes that the public interest is in fact determined by programs and actions of an autonomous political sphere of decision-making. The implication is that the ills we are facing can be righted by reforming, by pluralizing the political process. Davidoff even implies that the present ills result from the malfunctioning political process rather than from institutional decisions. Institutional economic decisions do not figure in Davidoff's essay. His otherwise correct criticism of comprehensive planning does not take into account that comprehensive planning is practically non-existent since decisions affecting the allocation of resources do not fall within the political sphere of purposive decision making.

Who gets what, where, why, and how, are indeed, as Davidoff claims, "the basic political questions which need to be raised about every allocation of public resources." But the adequacy of those resources and the institutional constraints placed on their allocation does not come into question. It is assumed that the system is slack to satisfy the demands placed on it.

Both the name and the model of advocacy planning is borrowed from legal practice. A planner, like a lawyer, will present the case of his client in an arbitrating process. But in the case of the legal practice there are laws, represented by a judge and a jury who ultimately decide according to specific evidence. Who decides in the case of advocacy, and according to what? The court is enabled by laws to decide and take action to safeguard the public interest.* These laws provide the explicit basis on which decisions are made. In the political process however decisions are made on the basis of availability of resources and the exercise of power. The implicit assumption of advocacy is that the current political process of decision-making is indeed a pluralistic process. As pluralist

*Theodore Lowi in fact poses the model of "juridical democracy" as an alternative to pluralism. This is quite different from the advocacy planning model. Lowi's model of juridical democracy is similar to a comprehensive resource allocation plan. By restoring the "rule of law" Lowi hopes that government programs will become explicit, and therefore democratic and, furthermore will force the government to take concrete action. This he sees as an alternative to interest-group liberalism which fails in both of the above counts.

theorists claim, although resources are unequally distributed they are equally available to all groups. The current conflicts and the malfunctioning of political institutions are only an expression of a temporary disequilibrium in the distribution of resources. But groups, if properly organized, can have access to these resources and if they articulate their interests rationally, their demands can be satisfied.

What types of power resources do the poor possess, and can they use in a bargaining process? First they possess, and can use the power of persuasion based on the righteousness of their position, i.e., that they are being harmed by certain actions and programs. Under a judicial system this power would be enough to satisfy their claims.* In the current political process, however, this power can be used to influence public opinion and to pressure the government.²² Second, they possess the direct political power of votes. Third, and most importantly, they possess power which is physically manifested. Cloward and Piven have advocated the use of disrupted tactics for the poor to achieve their goals. Thus, Piven claims that, "the force of the poor depends on the threat of instability...the threat of their growing and volatile numbers in the voting booth and in the streets."²³ Similarly, Edmund Burke points out the importance of this resource as a way of influencing the political

*Hence Lowi's model of juridical democracy.

process:

Change can be caused by confronting existing power centers with the power of numbers - an organized and committed mass of citizenry. In effect, a new center of power is created, based not upon control of wealth and institutions but upon size and dedication....Demonstrations, boycotts, and picketing are the common weapons of such mass organizations.²⁴

Finally, Davidoff and pluralist advocate planners generally assume that planning is central to the political process. Therefore technical knowledge is among the determining resources in the political process. Earl Blecher, for example, suggests that "with the increasing utilization of technical knowledge in urban policy-making, there has been a concurrent shift from traditional politics to emphasis on resources of expertise."²⁵ Lisa Peattie similarly has argued that "the shift from politics to expertise changes the rules for exercising power, as well as the structure of effective power."²⁶

A shift in emphasis therefore is assumed from traditional political power resources to technical resources. Viewing technical knowledge as a power resource, which when possessed and exercised will alter the outcome of planning decisions, presupposes that the planning process is responsive to inputs that can be technically expressed. There are two reasons why this pluralistic process is not working. First, the powerful interests have monopolized technical knowledge. They

have taken it away from the sphere of power resources by claiming that it does not belong there - it is a value free tool not to be used politically. Second, the poor cannot adequately challenge political decisions, as they lack technical skills. The advocate planner then takes it upon himself to politicize again the planning process and to provide technical resources to the deprived communities.

The process of the articulation and translation of values and desires to rational plans is central to the function of the advocacy planning model. As planning is seen as central to the political process, the major resource that is called for is technical knowledge through which values can be translated to plans and counterplans. The importance given to the counterplan is consistent with the pluralist assumption that conflicting interests are mediated in an explicit way and that the resolution of conflict and the satisfaction of the various interests would result from bargaining and arbitration and from the visible application of resources.

Within this model the advocate planner would perform several functions the most important of which are: a) education: "informing his clients of their rights under planning and renewal laws, about the general operations of city government....Assisting the client organization to clarify its ideas and to give expression to them,"²⁷ b) representing and expressing the views of his client: "the planner would plead

for his own and his client's view of the good society"²⁸ and
c) technical assistance: "he would be responsible to his client
for preparing plans and for all of the other elements compris-
ing the planning process".²⁹

The role of the advocate planner then is very similar to
the role of the political leader envisioned by pluralist
theory. He is responsive to group interests but he also per-
forms the vital function of articulating those interests in a
predetermined way, and of educating his client group and
channelling their activities into pluralist models of action.

Advocacy, like pluralism, requires a consensus on the
basic value and merit of the existing socioeconomic instit-
utions. The advocate planner, through his role as an educator,
explicitly solicits such consensus. As Earl Blecher, in his
major study on advocacy planning³⁰ has stated: "In the practice
of advocacy planning, there is a basic acceptance by interest
groups of the political and institutional parameters defining
the urban process." Pluralism sees apathy as representing
consensus. Advocacy suggests that apathy as well as hostile
and disruptive action, may be the result of lack of inform-
ation and ignorance on the part of community groups as to the
options available to them within the pluralist process. They
are also seen as the consequence of the shortcomings of govern-
ment agencies which, because of their bureaucratization, have
failed to respond and enhance the participation of a plurality
of interests. Thus advocacy attempts through its practice to

reform those government organizations and at the same time to "force those who have been critical of 'establishment' plans to produce superior plans, rather than only to carry out the very essential obligation of criticizing plans deemed improper." ³¹

I shall attempt to show that by assuming that the pluralist process can adequately represent all interests, advocacy attempts to channel protest and apathy to direct participation in this process, overlooking the possibility that these interests may be rational expressions of objective conditions that are inescapable to the particular institutional structure of society.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE LOGIC-IN-USE OF ADVOCACY

It may be argued that the pluralistic framework within which advocacy planning is placed in Davidoff's model - and which I presented above - is not generally or explicitly accepted by practicing advocates. Or it may be argued that many advocate planners are aware of the limitations of the pluralist framework in dealing with wider changes in society. As Davidoff himself has stated:

It may very well be that advocacy is a horrible name to describe a movement, a social movement, that is taking place in the field of planning just as it is taking place in a host of other professional fields now. It is perhaps, mainly a shorthand way to describe a change in values, a change in urgency and demand that has occurred.

A "social movement" however, and a "change in values and outlook" does not by itself prescribe any particular course of action. But advocacy planning taken in the strict sense, as a pluralist mode of action does provide such a framework. Out of the whole social movement of the sixties, pluralist advocacy planning is the only consistent theory that developed, and it was the major alternative to traditional approaches into which action was channelled. As Davidoff himself suggests:

The basic theme of advocacy planning (some would say,) is a redistribution of power, of wealth, and other opportunities in our society, and the whole

advocacy movement has developed with this concern in mind. In so doing, it has taken as one of its functions or thrusts the working in the communities that I've just discussed.*

This it does, as an example, as a means of providing a form of planning that will lead to a redistribution of power and opportunity and wealth.⁴

Pluralist advocacy planning is not only an example of a possible action which will answer the concerns of that social movement, but it is the major example. But whether it is one out of many other forms or the only concrete form that the "social movement" has taken - whether advocate planners practice it being conscious of its limitations, or they believe it is the solution to social change - advocacy planning might produce results which are adverse to the values of the movement that it came out of and, indeed, adverse to the ideal of the

*He refers to his earlier remarks that "advocate planning has been employed as a term to describe the role of a professional planner who goes to work with a community organization. to be an advocate of that group's interest in its development of plans, through the provision of information to the community so that it can make decisions about what it wishes in its plans."² He mentions the two variations of the model: a) indigenous advocate and spokesman for communities and b) community as its own advocate. The "general meaning...that advocacy has taken..." Davidoff said, "is that it is planning for those who have not been well represented,...who have been discriminated against in our society because other interests have always had their planners."³

pluralist model of social organization' (see chapter one). Of course the two things - e.g., advocacy as a way to reform professions versus advocacy as a way to achieve social justice - cannot be separated. Because, by the standards of the theory itself, a reformed profession would be one that could achieve social justice.

My objective then here is to evaluate this particular pluralist definition of advocacy planning from the point of view of advocacy planning as a "social movement" and the values and general objectives that it sets for itself.

Evaluations of advocacy planning tend to lose the perspective of that larger context that Davidoff is talking about. The very conference in which Davidoff made his remarks was set up to investigate the effectiveness and evaluate the experiences of various projects and models within this more restricted framework of advocacy as pluralism, that is, by accepting the basic pluralist assumptions of the practice. This task of course was proved to be impossible by the antagonism that developed between the planners and the black community people that were represented. Their anger and frustration contrasted sharply and illuminatingly with the concerns of workshop leaders and advocate planners to operationalize this frustration, to translate it to guidelines,

specification and recommendations.* As the chairman of the conference put it:

we did not get very far in regard to the development of a more sophisticated understanding of a pluralist planning process and the nature, theory and practice of democracy nor did we come up with any systematic sets of recommendations concerning how or if that which has been called advocacy planning could be operationalized or rationalized in a way more acceptable than had been the case⁶ or apparently the case up to that point.

Similarly, much of the literature on advocacy planning, defines the problems operationally. Models, roles and practices are evaluated in terms of how well they represent community interests, or how well they involve communities in the planning process. Thus Piven⁷ discusses the effectiveness of planning versus direct action, Kramer⁸ evaluates the effectiveness of the role of the "inside" versus that of the "outside" advocate to represent local interests. There have been exhaustive categorizations of advocacy planning types. These are usually based on the purpose of advocacy organizations, the identification of the organization's clientele,

*The leader of a workshop which was dominated by expressions of anger and rejection such as: "You cannot, as white planners, work in my best interest. History wasn't planned" and (sarcastically): "I need a planner to tell me what is the extent of my need", summarized the above concerns as follows:

"Professionals in the Ghetto:

- They must have political awareness;
- Preferably they should be black
- Whites can be acceptable, but they should be a last choice," etc.⁵

financing, methods of the organization, including styles and tactics, degree and type of community involvement, motives of the actors, time and duration of projects. Two of the most comprehensive studies on advocacy planning - evaluations commissioned and funded by OEO - by Shostak and Blecher⁹ undertake such a comparative analysis of the various models which are useful only if one has an understanding of the limitations of the models' outcomes, which are imposed not by the particular nuances of each model but by the general context in which the model is practiced.

The antagonism then that was exhibited at the conference can be seen as a collective condemnation of advocacy planning projects, an expression of inadequacy of the advocacy framework which cannot be corrected by altering the particular modes of operation within that framework - such as asking for black planners to represent black interests, or for the community to be its own planner.

Limitations of Practice Imposed by Objectives of Sponsors

First, certain impositions are placed on the goals and the practice of advocacy by the organizational demands of those institutions that have sponsored the various projects and advocacy planning organizations. Advocacy planning has developed as part of the community participation movement. The organizational form that this movement took was largely

shaped by the War on Poverty Act of 1964 and the Community Action Program, and the Model Cities legislation. Many authors have argued that the purpose of those Acts and of the Citizen Participation Movement was to integrate the apathetic or hostile new migrants in the political process, or to coopt demands and ensure implementation of government programs.

Shery Arnstein,¹⁰ Melvin Mogulof and others have argued that citizen participation projects can have various functions ranging from cooptation and manipulation to contention and citizen control. As it has already been documented, cooptation and manipulation was the main function of citizen participation in urban renewal.¹¹

Most importantly advocacy planning was influenced by the Community Action Program and the Poverty Act of 1964 which called for "maximum feasible participation" of the poor. The program acted as a catalyst in the establishment of advocacy planning and gave it direction and support, by providing financial assistance, and an institutional framework to community organizations and to advocacy agencies.

Although the aims and assumptions of the act are not altogether explicit or clear¹² there is ample evidence in both its history and its practice that points to the pluralistic basis of the act. It was a response to the insight that traditional administrative structures and programs, and voluntary organizations were incapable of solving the urban ghetto

problem and that new structures should be built. Its fore-runners, the Ford Foundation's Grey Areas Projects headed by Paul Yluisaker (which was to provide youth employment, education and services to communities); and Kennedy's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime assumed that poverty is not a problem of the individual that invites psychiatric solution. Based on the theories of Durkheim and Merton, the professionals of the fifties - particularly Lloyd Ohlin and Richard Cloward - asserted that anomie, and alienation are related to the problem of deviant behavior and delinquency. These problems therefore were seen not as properties of the individual but of the social structure.

The primary functional mechanism in this theory is the group, which gives direction, and rewards behavior consistent to its values. These programs then were largely conceived as providing new substitutes for traditional structures that had broken down.¹³

The CAP was not conceived as a way of overcoming pluralism but as a way of restoring it as a basis for rational politics. Although these projects rejected the idea that the problem is with the poor and accepted a social definition of it, they still attempted to solve the problem by attacking apathy itself rather than the institutions that cause poverty.

The evaluation of the outcomes of one such CAP experience by Cloward and Elman, is particularly illuminating. The result of the project was that

many more people from Stanton Street are on welfare than before. The storefront's clients are better clothed, better housed, and better fed than they were four years ago. Many now have telephones, quite a few have washing machines and television sets.

Are they better people? Are they worse? Such questions seem like the supreme irrelevancy. For if they are not better for their improved economic circumstances, the society is better for their actions against it.¹⁴

The function of CAP's was seen as restoring participation and the role of social organizations such as welfare agencies and bureaucratic administrations whose lost primary function was seen as enhancing the competitive urban process.

In a manner similar to advocacy planning the Poverty Program assumes that public agencies through bureaucratization and by being separated from the political process do not anymore perform the vital pluralist function of (a) being responsive to group and political interests and (b) insuring access of all groups to the pluralist process.

The poverty program, like the Urban Renewal Program does not get at the real causes of poverty. While Urban Renewal assumed that poverty and social problems were caused by environmental factors, the War of Poverty assumes that the cause of poverty is "being poor". The old welfare program (the Social Security Act of 1935) recognized the same thing and it attempted not to remedy, but to ease the

problem through a series of clear and concrete programs. In a sense then the old welfare program accepts the assumption that poverty is an objective phenomenon, a result of the institutionalized decision processes. It does not pretend to attempt to change those processes. As Lowi states: "Old Welfare was and is a(n immensely successful) means of tending to the human exhaust of capitalism....The purpose of Old Welfare was and is to make the march to the grave a bit more comfortable." ¹⁵ The assumptions of the War on Poverty and the CAP are that poverty is not an objective phenomenon caused by institutionalized decisions, but rather it is a result of a vicious circle which can be attacked by reforming and restructuring the pluralistic process and thus by treating the poor as a group rather than as a condition. The state had lost its function of ensuring the access of groups to the political process through its various institutions (welfare agencies, schools, employment offices, etc.) The task was to resurrect the function of those institutions.

The CAP was thus conceived merely as an integrating ¹⁶ mechanism into the political pluralistic process.

Those who subscribe to a conspiratorial view of history, as Bertram Beck suggests,

would imagine the most powerful figures in the military-industrial complex designing an anti-poverty program whereby poor people who do not participate in standard political processes would be diverted to toy elections and to fighting

among themselves over the control of pitifully inadequate sums of money. One could well imagine the leaders of such a complex encouraging the drive for community control with the knowledge that local sovereignty has always been the rallying cry of the reactionaries.¹⁷

In that vein for example, Frances Piven has suggested in several articles that the CAP and the War on Poverty were not merely integrating mechanisms into the political process, but specifically a strategy of the Democratic Party to organize and integrate into its ranks a new constituency. The net effect of the events of the fifties was for the Democratic Party to lose its base in the South, and to be threatened by the crisis in the North. Thus, according to Piven,

(Kennedy) Administration analysts began to explore new programs for the cities that might cement the allegiance of the urban black vote to the national party and stimulate local Democratic organizations to be more responsive to the new voters.... Whatever the actual social benefits (of the programs that followed), they also met the political needs of the Democratic Administration in adjusting to population changes in the cities...(such programs) can be understood as a strategy to integrate the new migrants into the political structure of the city by offering them various forms of patronage distributed by local "citizen participants" whom the projects selected and cultivated.¹⁸

Professionals, "many of whom were called 'advocates'", were important for the execution of the strategy. Except for the jobs that were provided indirectly to professionals, through the funding of various CAPs, the Office of Economic Opportunity funded directly professional advocacy planning agencies, ARCH in New York, UPA in Cambridge, CDC in San Francisco, among others. It is argued that this was a deliberate political decision on the part of OEO. In 1967, a crisis situation occurred when the passage of the OEO bill was met with considerable opposition in the Congress from conservative members who claimed that "extremist groups have seized it (the CAP) as a forum for dissent."¹⁹

This view was shared by radicals themselves. Stanley Aronowitz was reported for example, in a conservative weekly, "attacking the entire Poverty Program except for a single aspect which he described as a 'valuable tool' for the radical movement. 'At least', he said, 'it has given employment to the organizers'."²⁰

The response of the Congress made it clear that the restructuring of basic institutions was not the objective of CAP. Concern grew over the "obstructionist" attitudes of citizen groups and their protest and confrontation to planning and implementation. The solution to this, as I shall explain below, was more controlled participation.

There was concern in the Congress that OEO and CAP activities were not producing positive results in urban development.

The view of OEO officials was very similar to that of advocate planners: Plans affecting poor communities were seen as expressing powerful interests. The poor affected by the plans had no way of learning of the plans or expressing their own interests until too late so that the only strategy that was left to them was an "all-or-nothing" confrontation and obstructionism. In an internal OEO memorandum outlining the need for advocacy planning programs, Michael Mazer, programs officer of the Housing Branch of OEO stated that

poor people have become unwilling to accept official decisions which they had no part in formulating....They have learned how to build community organizations to oppose official action. With increasing sophistication they have been more and more able to delay or derail official programs and to save themselves and their neighbors from programs which threaten their own best interest.²¹

The way out of this problem was to turn disruptive community action to constructive proposals. "The problem is to turn these organizations to constructive ends and to capitalize on the growing official understanding of the need for meaningful citizen participation in the planning process...." Mazer said, "Redevelopment activities cannot be carried on unless effective citizen participation is integrated into the planning process...."²²

The way to achieve this and overcome "obstructionism" was thought to be through technical skill and knowledge of the

planning process so that poor people could present and articulate their demands in a constructive way. Hence the funding by OEO of advocacy planning projects which would "make available architects, planners, financial analysts, and other specialists so that communities can organize their protests around viable alternatives."²³

This strategy of OEO, which corresponded to advocacy planning as it was first formulated by Davidoff, shaped the practice of advocacy at least until 1969. If the strategy was modified later to consider other models of advocacy action, such as establishing community advocacy planning organizations with local control of planning skills and activities, the basic pluralist assumptions on the nature of "the plan" and the planning process remained the same.

The direction and the particular function that this strategy implies for advocacy is clear. To the extent that advocate planners have been under hire by such public agencies as OEO, one would expect them to be responsive to the interest of those agencies. This of course is not a sufficient argument for analyzing and criticizing advocacy. One can argue that an advocacy organization in its funding proposal will and does present its work in a way that is consistent with the interests of the sponsoring agency, so that there is quite a discrepancy between what the organization claims it does and what it actually does. Further, in a similar manner one would expect

the OEO officials to present a strategy in a way that is satisfactory to the Congress while their own aims and behavior in running the agency follow different objectives. Both of these points are true, in the experience of at least one major advocacy planning organization. But in either case the changes and reform programs that have been funded by the government did have a specific political objective: to coopt and integrate dissenting and apathetic constituencies. This objective may not have been imposed directly on the practice of advocacy through the selective funding and other possible controls over projects but it provided the limits of advocacy practice in the aggregate scale.

To develop a sufficient argument, one must look at the concrete practice of advocacy rather than just the demands of the sponsors. I shall therefore look at the practice of advocacy planning to discuss how the pluralist assumptions are manifested in the experience of advocacy projects and to see to what extent the perceived limitations of the outcomes of such projects can be explained by the pluralist assumptions of various advocacy models rather than by their own imperfection.

Issues and Constituencies: Group Interests and the Clients of Advocacy

The existence of large and active community participation in the planning process is seen by advocates as instrumental

to the effective practice of pluralist democracy. If only the poor show an active interest in the planning process, they can insert their own values in it and affect the decisions in a way beneficial to them.

Most projects however, discover that the poor are indifferent and often hostile to the planning process. For example, in my own experience in the Holyoke project (see Appendix) the neighborhood residents showed an active interest when they were threatened by the Master Plan but became silent and apathetic when time came to develop alternative plans for their neighborhood.

The observation that the client groups are mobilized when they are adversely affected by planning decisions while they show no active interest in participating in the process of developing alternatives seems to be common to advocacy planning projects.

The client, or constituency is usually those interest groups that have been left out of or hurt by the planning process. They are referred to as 'community groups', 'the poor', 'the neighborhood'. The difficulty which we encountered and which is often pointed out in the literature is that communities are apathetic and disorganized.

Some social scientists have argued that lack of participation is explained by "the inability of the poor to comprehend theoretical formulations and to conceptualize well enough

to gain a complete understanding of causative factors to which
a program would be directed?"²⁴

Pluralists, like Dahl, claim that the poor do not participate because they are by nature apathetic. Advocate planners suggest that it is because they have no information on the available opportunity structure and thus do not know how to use it for their benefit. But in fact the experience of various advocacy projects shows that explaining the opportunity structure and providing the necessary technical information, helping the poor "to design the political strategies needed to achieve the group's priorities" and "to conceptualize what programmatic approaches will benefit the community"²⁵ does not necessarily bring with it active community participation. The poor show little concern about being left out of the planning process until they are adversely affected by it and then they attempt to obstruct the plans. They will take action only in response to a threat. In fact, a "community" will only be identified as such in a situation where it is threatened. As Lisa Peattie points out:

Community organizations tend to appear...as a response to a threat: 'the neighborhood' or 'the community' comes to be articulated as that area about to be affected by some public policy, as in an urban renewal program. It is the organizations that appear to 'represent' such 'communities' which are likely to be the natural clients for the advocate planner.²⁶

A political decision such as the Urban Renewal Plan in the South End and the Master Plan in the City of Holyoke, confronts the community directly, and being political it has to do with values. The community therefore, if affected by it, will assert its own values, and will take an active role in that process employing its resources - technical or physical and vocal - to change the decision.

As Dahl has stated, then, the poor will be mobilized, will rise out of their apathy and take political action, only when they are directly, and adversely, affected by political decisions. A graphic and illuminating example is given by a participant in the Conference on Advocacy and Pluralist Planning. Explaining the problem they had in this community in getting the residents involved, he enumerated various techniques for bring prople to the meetings:

Another technique was to stop at doors and seem to be writing something, like a city official. The next day, you send out a bill saying that they'd better come to a meeting. We had to use this sneaky technique for a long time. We told them that the bulldozer was coming through. We then selected an area where people weren't interested: two blocks say.. Our people then knocked at the doors and said they were from the Housing Department. The people would say, 'why our house?'. We'd say, 'Well, you don't come to a meeting, we didn't think you care'. We even brought in the railroad.... We went saying to people who weren't showing too much interest that they had to move the railroad tracks from

down near the river to the middle of their neighborhood. 'You'd better get out (to a meeting), if you don't want that to happen', we'd say

Similarly in the Holyoke Project it seems that we made the tactical error of not pushing the development plan at the same time the community was mobilized in opposing the Master Plan.

The common experience then is that homo civicus, to use Dahl's terminology, is indeed not interested in participating in the political and planning process for the sake of the process itself. He is interested in it only in the case that he is adversely affected by it.* This is not because homo civicus is a species naturally apathetic to political processes nor is it because the community has no information or resources. Nor is it because he is not interested in the political or planning process unless this process produces plans that threaten his interests. I shall contend, rather, that communities are indeed interested in political processes that affect

*Our contacts with the Holyoke neighborhood (see Appendix) were almost exclusively representative of homo politicus. They showed interest in the process because, as Dahl points out, they received personal gratification from that process. Their interest in the process was not directly related to the concept of politics and planning as purposive action. This was not true with the larger community which had nothing to gain from 'participating as a value in itself.' In the early meetings, suggestions of local leaders, totally alien to the interests of the community, were expressed, such as that we "should tear down existing housing units and replace them with high rise apartment houses overlooking the river."

them (whether adversely or not) but that they have been alienated from such processes because the latter have been used as instruments of the powerful interests.

Apathy cannot be explained by lack of time, interest, intelligence, or skills. Nor can it be explained away as something natural to certain individuals. It is, rather, the result of the primary function that the political process performs: an appendage to, and a mechanism to solidify institutionalized decision mechanisms and the consequent unequal distribution of power.

It has often been pointed out that the middle classes are more actively involved in the political process, than the poor communities. The alternative explanation then would seem to be, as Lisa Peattie suggests, that

as things work, the institutions with which people may collaborate or negotiate are responding particularly to the pressure of middle class interests, and are (not oddly) more relevant to those interests than they are to those of the people at the bottom²⁸

Further, as I have argued, the objective condition of the poor is not an object of political decision mechanisms. Such mechanisms deal with this condition only insofar as they can translate it into a set of 'rational' and quantitative demands. 'Being poor' is not an issue that communities organize around. The immediate issue is the highway that will dislocate them, the late paycheck, rent, or the master plan that poses an

immediate threat to them. As a result, the "mobilization of bias" that emerges from such a restricted use of political decisions, suggests that objective conditions which are determined by institutionalized decision mechanisms, are natural or given, rather than historical, and objects of purposive action. Institutionalized decisions are not confronted politically but individually. A person will do what is rational within the existing institutional constraints rather than challenge those constraints. To be poor is dealt with by attempting to overcome poverty on a personal basis rather than by changing national priorities and institutionalized mechanisms.

The issues then tend to define the "community" and therefore the advocate's client. Although advocates speak of "the poor" as a class with common problems of their own, the clients are not taken as representatives of that class but as 'neighborhoods' and 'communities' with their own particular problems whose only common characteristic is discrimination in the planning process and their lack of technical resources. Thus "community" tends to be defined along issues that are results of political decisions rather than institutional ones.

The Role of the Advocate Planner and the Use of Technical and Other Resources

Various models are discussed in the planning literature on the role of the advocate as a spokesman of community needs. Marshall Kaplan distinguishes between the "inside" ("indirect") advocate and the "outside" ("direct") advocate. The inside or indirect role is one in which the planner is employed by a public agency or the government through which he attempts to discover the needs of the poor and advocate them in the agency. This first model is based on what Moynihan has called the "professionalization of reform". The professional and the planner discover for the poor what the issues are. In fact, according to this view it is the professionals such as Michael Harrington with his The Other America who rediscovered poverty. Thus, according to Moynihan "the poverty program was declared not as the behest of the poor; it was declared in their interest by persons confident of their own judgment in such matters."²⁹

Through social indicators, or marketing techniques, or other research methods the planner discovers the issues and local interests and acts as a spokesman. The role of the planner in this model is very similar to the role that Robert Dahl sees the professional performing. Without overtly working for and representing specific interests, he is sensitive to different values and political pressures.

According to an earlier paper by Davidoff, "It is not for the planner to make the final decision transforming values into policy commitments. His role is to identify the distribution of values among people, and how values are weighed against each other."³⁰

A second, more direct model and the most common in the practice is that of the 'outside' or 'direct' advocate. In this case the planner - no matter who pays him - is directly responsible to his clients: the community groups that he directly represents in the planning process. This is the model that advocacy planning calls for. The advocate planner should make explicit his own values and the interests he represents. The planning process should be explicitly pluralized rather than remain neutral under the guise of automatic regulation through countervailing forces.

Community groups and frustrated local residents have often argued that both of the above models are inadequate, that white advocates do not understand the problems of black communities, that no results are in sight, that the issues become too technical, and that more action is needed. This was obvious in the Conference on Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning (see above) where community participants expressed their frustration with the current practices of advocacy.

The attempt to operationalize this frustration has led to suggestions on two alternative models of planning. The

first model suggests that "the white advocate is the wrong person to act as the advocate. The thought grows that the black community may very well wish to have a black spokesman and that the advocate, if there is such an advocate in the community, should be a black man."³¹ Several advocacy agencies operate on that model: ARCH, and 2MJQ in Harlem and the Black Design Workshop in New Haven. One of those groups has gone as far as to suggest that

black trained designer-planners, sworn and dedicated to the promotion, protection and advocacy of black planning interests are a (if not the) crucial missing link in the struggle of inner city black people to acquire the control they are now demanding for their communities.³²

A final model that is suggested as a way of overcoming the problem of discrepancy of values and representation between planner and community is that the community act as its own spokesman and advocate. As Davidoff put it:

another idea has been developed... that the community should not have to rely on an expert to advocate for them; that the community will grow weak if it calls upon an outsider to be their advocate. The community must advocate its own interests and increasingly communities in our cities have become sophisticated on the techniques of presentation. In such communities there still might be a role for the advocate planner...to provide the technical assistance and the information necessary to permit a community to develop a plan.³³

What is crucial in these models is that technical skills and information are still seen as the instrumental resource. The Davidoffs, for example, see the alternatives in the following manner:

If the planners for minority groups are middle-class white professionals... then manipulation of the clients by those professionals and imposition of the professionals' ideas upon the clients will always be a potential danger.

Neither of these outcomes need raise problems if we accept the elitist notion that the professional knows best about what the client should do. If we reject the elitist notion of social change, as we do, then a planning process prior to action calls for participation by the group for whose benefit the action is planned, and the poor people and blacks must therefore be "planners"; that is they must have some set of concepts to guide them in making decisions about developing their political power.³⁴

In this view, then, the value of the planning process and therefore of planning skills is still paramount. As in all of the above models, the resources that the advocate planner possesses and provides, technical skills, are very important. The planner, black or white, will still have to educate and inform the community "to permit it to develop a plan." A conviction that black advocates are the missing link is a conviction that technical resources are the answer and that the political process has the slack to provide for the most radical demands.

What is usually not dealt with in these models, is that technical knowledge itself is not value-free. Perlman and Jones have observed that:

the question of what to do becomes a question of what can be done, for the choice of a policy for action must be realistic in the light of resistance to change that can be anticipated. The strategy to follow must be related to opportunities that are available in the real world of competing interests, if it is to be more than a Utopian dream. 35

This observation is confirmed by the experience of many advocacy projects. In the appendix, I give a detailed account of how this is the case in my own experience, particularly in the Holyoke project. Once the issues and the problems of a community are identified (such as lack of services, deterioration of housing, blight, lack of open space, etc) the selection of concrete goals and strategies and scenarios for achieving them is circumscribed by the available opportunity structure. If a planner (whether a professional or the community itself) draws up an idealized plan for the community, of what needs to be done, and how the community would look like in an ideal situation, then this plan is of no practical value to the community. It is only a utopian projection on the basis of which no action can be taken and no strategy can evolve since it does not correspond to any of the available opportunities. Nonetheless, such utopian plans are often

drawn with dangerous consequences. They serve as a way of raising the hopes of the clients without the benefit of informing them of how the goals of such plans could be pursued and attained, thus frustrating their desires and hopes and whatever trust they have on the planning process.

Advocate planners, then, are forced by the circumstances to bypass or superimpose on the idealized plan, one that will identify concrete and attainable goals and translate them into instrumental objectives identifying the various strategies - existing city, state, and federal programs - that can be pressured and utilized.

Therefore, through technical skills an objective condition of a community is translated into a series of demands that are marketable in the existing pluralistic process. The function that advocate planners and their technical skills perform is very similar to the function of social scientists in the classic Hawthorne experiment. A statement such as "wages are too low" which expresses an objective condition of a certain social class, is personalized, it becomes rational by being translated into the statement "worker x's earnings, due to his wife's illness, are insufficient to meet his current obligations." Or a statement such as "the community is deteriorating" is again translated into concrete demands for housing subsidies, improvement of services, etc. Technical skill is taken to mean the knowledge and ability to translate needs and apply the appropriate existing technologies for solving them.

But the technological solutions are limited not only in terms of the existing level of technology and scarcity, but they are also limited by the specific productive relations and political institutions. Technical knowledge carries with it the bias of the existing political process. Thus, technical knowledge in specific terms for the planner means knowledge of FHA regulations and government housing programs and procedures, local housing codes, urban renewal and model cities regulations, public housing regulations, real estate law, etc. (plus formal planning skills such as data gathering and analysis). As Lisa Peattie has stated: "the power to conceptualize is a power to manipulate."³⁶ No matter who possesses this power to conceptualize, the technical skills of the planner, possesses the power to manipulate.

Lisa Peattie suggests that the advocate planner "is not and can never be a simple channel through which flow the 'interests of community'. Those interests become transformed as they pass into the planner's technical framework."³⁷ The question then of whether the planner can act as a spokesman of community interests is not based on the attitudes of the particular planner and therefore cannot be resolved by changing the planner, or by handing the appropriate skills over to the community. The question is structural; it has to do with those skills themselves. What is perceived as a failure on the part of planners to represent community interests is a failure of the technical planning framework.

The frustration of community groups cannot be perceived as a failure or lack of communication between planner and community which can simply be corrected by the direct transfer of skills to local leaders. As Lisa Peattie points out:

The agenda...is largely set...
by the action opportunity structure.
The items for the agenda are
presented by the available pro-
grams and institutions and their
priority must reflect the necessity
of dealing with and the possibility
of taking advantage of the programs
that exist.³⁸

Thus advocacy planning simply transfers the rationality and neutrality of technical knowledge from the overall political decision-making process to the community. Technical knowledge is not altered; it is simply transposed: Roland Warren has pointed out that "the injection of rational-technical considerations (under this model)...occurs in relation to certain of the respective parties to the political decision-making process rather than in relation to the whole process."³⁹

Advocate planners have always asserted that technical knowledge is not value-free. But they have based this assertion on the fact that knowledge and skills are monopolized by powerful interests. I have argued here that technical skill is value loaded for the additional reason that it is biased in terms of suggesting certain kinds of action-compatible with the existing opportunity structure - while excluding others - action that now seems utopian even though our society has the productive capacity and the potential to make it possible and real once the institutionalized constraints

are altered. Is it possible to develop a kind of knowledge that does not present the drawbacks of utopianism and at the same time does not restrict the alternatives to the existing and inadequate opportunity structure? This question will be left open at this point.⁴⁰

As with pluralism, advocacy planning, although conceived as an alternative to the elitist, value-free model of public interest planning, reverts back to elitism. The advocate planner, although he is supposed to politicize the planning process and represent the interests of, and be answerable to his low-income clients, performs the important function of checking his clients, giving a direction to their actions and channelling their dissatisfaction and their demands within the existing political system.

The elitism that is exhibited by the logic-in-use of pluralism and advocacy is not pursued as a value in itself, i.e., its function is not to justify a privileged position for planners and technicians - although advocacy planning has been accused of this.⁴¹ Rather, it is pursued for its function as a socializing and a stabilizing force. The emphasis is not on the advocate planner but on the technical resources that he possesses. It is the technical resources that perform the function of integration rather than the planner himself. The planner is only the carrier of those resources. Therefore the various alternatives given to advocacy planning

models, as long as they rely on the same assumption as to the nature of political institutions, and as long as they bypass the objective conditions of the community and channel the local resources to the pluralist process. are subjected to the same limitations and the same criticism as pluralist theory.

Several planners have criticized advocacy planning in that it diverts by its emphasis on skills and the planning process, from other, more effective kinds of action. They claim that traditional resources such as disruptive action and demonstrations are more effective than planning in bringing about change. In the conference on Advocacy and Pluralist Planning, mentioned earlier, the last remarks were made by a self-proclaimed "black and proud street nigger":

Tell the system to stop planning us into trickbags. We are human beings and we will soon react like humans. The Federal government will not plan anything in the best interests of oppressed people....All the changes that have come about in the last two years have come about through the action of 'street niggers'We will call for technical assistance and foreign aid when we need it.⁴²

This contrasted sharply with the remarks of an advocate planner made earlier:

If the money that is shut off to the kinds of groups that have been encouraged and developed in the neighborhood are not allowed to exist in the future....Then the kinds of things we may see in the neighborhood will be a new kind of resident participation, probably

not involving some of the people who have been involved today, but involving others who are going to be concerned with quick action and I think we know what kind of quick action this may be.⁴³

The most outspoken critic of advocacy planning on this issue is Frances Piven who claims that "A plan, of itself, is not force.... Involving local groups in elaborate planning procedures is to guide them into a narrowly circumscribed form of political action."⁴⁴ Piven brings the example of an advocacy planning project, the "Alternate Plan for Cooper Square" which relied heavily on technical resources:

After ten years of arduous effort... a small portion of the Alternate Plan had been given formal sanction even though that portion was still far from implementation. The chief accomplishment was that the neighborhood had stopped the early threat of renewal. As Walter Thabit said sourly when it was all over, 'Protest⁴⁵ without planning could have done as much'.

Piven concludes that

the advocates are coaxing ghetto leaders (and local groups) off the streets and away from the trouble they might make there, and absorbing them in elaborate procedures called planning procedures which are effective indeed in dampening any impulse for the disruptive activities which have always been the main political resources of the very poor.⁴⁶

Piven - and others - argue that the needs that people have should be expressed directly, without a technical mediating process and that governmental institutions should be confronted in a direct fashion. Although several advocate

planners see disruptive tactics as detrimental to the pluralist process and advocate exclusively the use of technical skills, in fact, it is not clear from observing the practice of advocacy that Piven is right in her observations.

Advocacy planning projects have attempted to use those observable power resources in various degrees and have employed differing tactics - according to the leverage points allowed by the situation and the particular outlook of the participants. In various projects around the Boston area, for example, power resources have been used imaginatively with varying degrees of success. When normal channels of public pressure and the judicial process did not work in persuading a landlord to repair his apartments, tenants resorted to picketing his suburban home so that his own peers would put pressure on him. When public authorities did not respond to citizen pressure and countless counterplans, and went ahead with demolishing much needed housing units in the South End, the residents resorted to obstructive tactics: occupying and squatting into empty buildings, and occupying public property, disrupting its current use as a parking lot and building shacks and tents on it to demonstrate the urgent need for housing. When the plight of large dislocated families did not persuade the city of Lynn to provide a working program which adequately covers their need, citizens' organizations resorted to the courts to seek action to block a

3.9 million dollar renewal bond issue, and successfully took action to vote out of office the uncooperative mayor and city council members.

The use of force and disruption is just another resource that the poor possess in pressuring the political process. The alternative that Piven suggests - disruptive rather than counterplan - is only a use of a different tactic but it is addressed to the same system of politics. It may be more efficacious, as she point out, in bringing about results, and certainly the examples mentioned above support her argument. It increases the costs of the normal functioning of institutions and thus it can bring more pressure to political mechanisms. But it is still addressed to the same political mechanisms that the counterplan is addressed to. It still assumes that political mechanisms can respond to interest group demands. Protest and disruption can sometimes be more effective than the counterplan as a tactic, but their effectiveness is circumscribed by the same constraints that advocacy planning is limited by. The example of the Cooper Square project that Piven uses, is a good case in point. It is possible, as she and Walter Thabit suggest that protest could have more effectively and more quickly stopped the "early threat of renewal." It is doubtful however, that protest could have been more successful than the counterplan in achieving positive results and in implementing the Alternate Plan for Cooper Square.

Sumner Rosen, who adheres to the pluralist model of politics, criticizes Piven by arguing that

Any political system survives because those who run it understand and respond to the expression of needs, whether these take organized or disorganized form, whether they are made manifest through normal channels or through the mobilization of people in the streets.⁴⁷

In other words, the alternative that Piven suggests is only tactical, and by itself it cannot significantly alter the nature of the outcomes of the practice, although it can be more effective in bringing about those outcomes.

The Limitations of Political Decisions

Advocacy planning, like pluralism, does not recognize the limitations of the political institutions. As I have argued in the previous chapter, it does this, often, by consciously and deliberately assuming the autonomy of politics, that is, by accepting the framework of pluralist theory, and its assumptions that all needs can be satisfied when properly presented and mediated in the political process.

Whether in fact advocate planners explicitly accept the pluralist model or not, the practice of advocacy as shown above exhibits the limitations of the pluralist model. The urge to produce concrete results and short term benefits for the specific community and interest group that the advocate

represents, necessitates a direct involvement within the political process; issues tend to be defined, by necessity, along the lines dictated by the existing "opportunity structure" and available programs. As Marshall Kaplan put it:

(Advocacy) implies evolutionary rather than revolutionary changes in the institutional or delivery system... alternatives with respect to the relationships would vary by issue, by community, by stage in the planning process, by available resources and recorded priorities.... Given the complex problems facing the poor, plans premised on ideologies are, at best, irrelevant and at worst, harmful to the specific interests of the poor for they represent unreal, often misplaced, abstractions.⁴⁸

The "specific interests" of the poor that Kaplan has in mind are not the objective interests. In the practice of advocacy, objective interests are seen as 'unreal' and 'utopian' since there is no mechanism in the existing opportunity structure to deal with them. Thus issues tend to be defined along local and "available opportunity" lines rather than as results of institutional mechanisms that require more fundamental changes.

Advocacy planning is, therefore, instrumental in coopting demands not in terms of ensuring the implementation of specific programs (as it was the case with 'citizens participation' in Urban Renewal) but in terms of channelling demands to a political process which it claims to be pluralistic. To avert the social conflict that could potentially develop (as it did

in the Urban riots) out of the consequences of institutionalized decisions, the state, and the political decision mechanisms translate these consequences (which we have called here objective conditions) into marketable, quantitative, and piecemeal demands: wages, hours, housing subsidies, etc. They integrate them into the sphere of 'rational' pluralist politics.

Advocate planners, who explicitly accept the pluralist assumptions, claim that there is nothing wrong with integration. In this view integration is not seen as something wrong but as something necessary. Sumner Rosen, (in response to Piven's criticism on the integrating function of advocacy planning), claims that "any political system survives because those who run it understand and respond to the expression of needs whether these take an organized or disorganized form".⁴⁹

One thing that is certain from observing the outcome of various advocacy planning projects is that if the practice was conceived by those who sponsored it as a strategy for coopting affected communities and ensuring the implementation of various projects such as urban renewal then this strategy failed. As it has often been pointed out⁵⁰ advocacy planning projects have been most successful in a negative sense. In only one of my experiences the result has been to insure the implementation of a project. And still that was by no means the fault of the advocate planner: my involvement with the Roxbury Library Committee (see Appendix). Usually though,

advocacy planning projects have been most successful in their opposition to various programs. Highways have been stopped and urban renewal bulldozers have been turned around. But apart from this negative success, the positive outcomes of advocacy planning have been very limited.

Advocacy planning has been incapable of producing any results in the sphere of initiation of projects. This lack of success cannot be attributed to the lack of technical skills, or lack of community interest in that stage of planning. When Urban Planning Aid was asked to help a community group in Boston's South End to fight a highschool project which called for demolition of 400 housing units, it was able to achieve its ends through a concerted effort with the community. But as Dennis Blackett, then a director of UPA, explained, "when they (the community) got the opportunity to stay there, they then wanted to build housing. That was exactly that point where UPA was no longer able to be effective."⁵¹ Similarly, in my experience with the Holyoke Project (see Appendix) the advocates and the community were successful in deleting that part of the Master Plan that was a threat to the neighborhood. But in our attempts to implement plans that would rehabilitate the community we were unsuccessful.

The contention here, with all modesty, is that these limitations, that have been observed in the outcomes of advocacy projects, cannot be blamed exclusively or predominantly on

limitations of specific models of planning and on our own ineffectiveness as planners, but rather on the nature of the political institutions to which advocacy planning channels its resources. As I have argued in Chapter II, the political decision mechanism contains inherent limitations in satisfying demands placed on it. Advocacy planning in attempting to manipulate the political process - the various government programs that exist - produces an outcome which is determined not only by the available resources and skills that the planner has, and by the degree of participation by community groups, but it is also determined by factors external to the advocacy planning process: the limitations of the pluralist institutions themselves.

First, the funds that these programs possess are limited. The possible material outcomes of advocacy planning projects are, therefore, also limited:

a) Advocacy planning projects can reform bureaucratic institutions such as welfare organizations to make full use of their authority and resources in providing services for the poor. One example of this is the experience and the strategy that Frances Piven calls for, in New York and other cities, in reforming the welfare bureaucracies, expanding the payrolls as well as breadth of services such as clothing, housing, food, etc.⁵²

b) To the extent that programs and resources are available for attacking social ills, advocacy planning can succeed

in making these projects more responsive to the needs that they are addressed to.

c) Advocacy planning has been most successful in stopping plans and programs that have adverse effects on communities. None of these outcomes however, entails any considerable redistribution of resources. Since funds are limited, a successful attempt on the part of one group to have funds released to satisfy their needs usually entails disregard for the interests of another group.

Although advocacy planning operates mostly on the local level, it can have certain effects on the redistributive process and the policy decisions at the national level. This can be achieved by the collective pressure that local projects exert on the various programs for positive outcomes. One such strategy to change national priorities starting from the local level of pressure on the political system has been outlined by Cloward and Piven. They argue that local attempts to disrupt city services and strategies to bankrupt the cities by making exorbitant demands on them (for what they are capable of satisfying) would have an effect on the national policy:

Urban political leaders already on the brink of fiscal disaster because they are squeezed between the services needed by an enlarging ghetto constituency and the indignation of their white taxpaying constituents, are becoming insistent lobbyists for increased federal subsidies.⁵³

The outcomes of this strategy are difficult to assess. Certainly cities do lobby for adequate funds. But whatever redistributions of services and resources occur on the national level, cannot be attributed directly to advocacy planning. Other types of pressure are also important, most of all the public reaction and protest which emerge when objective conditions cannot anymore be coped with or hidden by traditional programs and practices. A more effective strategy for change on the national level would be the direct organization, lobbying and pressure by nationwide interest groups, as is the case with the National Welfare Rights Organization and National Tenants Organization.

Second, and most important, political mechanisms and government programs are not autonomous from institutional constraints. The condition of a community is an objective condition; it is the result of institutional decisions: it is determined by the normal reproduction of institutional decision mechanisms. Only to a very limited extent the conditions that advocacy planning is confronting are results of political decisions. And in those cases, it is extremely successful. The success in opposing plans is due to the fact that those plans originate from a purposive political process.

But the objective conditions of a class or a community that advocacy attempts to remedy - such as income inequality, or urban deterioration - are not results of political decisions.

They are results of institutional mechanisms, to borrow Robert Wolff's terminology, they are events that are not objects of decision of the political process. The political process is an appendage to the socioeconomic institutions. Its decisions are not only restricted by institutional constraints but rely on institutional mechanisms to provide the needed services. Whatever socialized housing exists is a series of subsidies to financiers and developers. Thus even if an advocacy planning project is successful in improving the housing situation in a neighborhood by forcing a local housing authority to make full use of its funds in supporting the construction of a 236 project or leased housing units, the ultimate beneficiary would be the investor who receives a return of 25-30% on his investment.⁵⁴ In such a situation government programs, and the political structure of decision-making does little to alter the objective conditions of the poor, and, in fact, reinforces the existing institutionalized mechanisms that produce these inequalities, by guaranteeing investments and taking the risk out of situations that would not be profitable otherwise.

Even where the state is responsive to the interests of the disadvantaged and adopts programs that are directed to benefit the poor, the functioning of institutionalized mechanisms often makes these programs inoperable. A most typical case is that of rent control ordinances whose short

term effect might be beneficial to tenants, but in the long run the function of the market and of the system of incentives will discourage any further investment in the housing sector resulting in the deterioration of the housing stock.

Advocacy planning, by accepting this framework, becomes a way of improving the opportunity structure to a pluralist process which is limited in what it can achieve and is only an appendage to institutionalized decision-making.

Its interpretation of social justice is commensurate with, to use Martin Rein's observation: "the American interpretation of social justice that places its faith in programs designed to equalize the opportunity to be unequal."⁵⁵

CONCLUSIONS

In the first chapter I proposed that I would investigate advocacy planning as a professional movement which could serve as a catalyst for social change and for bringing about an equitable distribution of resources, a democratic way of decision-making, and a better quality of environment. I suggested that my own personal concern was to investigate ways of achieving those goals. I argued therefore that this would be a fair basis for the evaluation of advocacy planning since advocacy planning is a concrete form of a social movement that was also concerned with the above questions, that was troubled with the existing social inequities and the inadequacy of traditional forms of professional practice and of political mechanisms for dealing with those inequities.

This social movement in its specific form of advocacy planning adopted the pluralist model of social organization and of social action. It appealed to the prescriptive value of the model, as a desirable way of democratically organizing decisions (chapter one). But also, as I have shown, sometimes in its theory (Davidoff - chapter three), and definitely in its practice (chapter four) it proposed the direct application of the pluralist model as a way of solving social problems. I have argued (chapter two) that this entails certain assumptions about the nature of existing decision

mechanisms and of what it takes to change them. The logic that the theory acquires as a strategy for social change - its logic-in-use - is quite different from its logic as a description of an ideal or a utopian model of social organization.

In its logic-in-use, then, advocacy planning assumes that the existing institutions are potentially pluralistic. Poverty and social ills are not seen as the results of institutionalized decision-making processes and, therefore, basic in our type of social organization, but as the result of a malfunctioning political system, a pluralist process in disequilibrium. The main aspect of this malfunctioning is the rigidification of government authorities and the neutral and non-political stance of the planner which renders the planning process - which is essentially a political process - incapable of functioning as a way of representing a plurality of values. I must emphasize again here that this assumption, although not always explicit in the theory, is essential in the logic-in-use, the practice of advocacy planning. The system of delivery of goods and services is seen as slack and open to the pressure of interest groups. What the poor need is not a basic redistribution of resources but political resources and particularly technical skills and information to be able to adequately compete in the political and planning process.

Thus, advocacy planning is concerned with improving the opportunity of the poor to participate in the planning process and to exploit the available opportunities and resources.

Further, I have argued that the pluralist assumptions that are manifested in the practice of advocacy impose severe limitations on its outcomes. The successes of advocacy projects are usually limited to the opposition of plans that are harmful to the interests of the community. Cases where communities have gone beyond the phase of opposition and have successfully implemented their plans, are very few. Available resources are limited and community groups must compete against each other for them. The dimension of successful outcomes is insignificant compared to the magnitude of the task. The existing opportunity structure is inadequate and, however well exploited, cannot provide for the needs of the advocate's clients. This opportunity structure can be widened only through a national redistribution of income, a policy which would conflict with the institutionalized decision mechanisms - the market, private ownership of resources, etcetera.

Advocate planners have attempted to deal with those limitations operationally, by exploring and evaluating alternative styles of practice. Alternative models of practice can be more or less effective in bringing about the outcomes in which advocacy has been successful, but they cannot alter the limits of those outcomes as long as pluralist assumptions prevail in

the practice. In fact, as I have argued, by diverting the attention of the poor away from basic social injustices and directing it to the technical articulation of their interests and participation in the planning process, action that could lead to fundamental social change is avoided.

By its choice of issues and client groups and its emphasis on technical resources the logic-in-use of advocacy planning is to integrate its clients into the local political process. It coopts potentially radical demands that could be based on the objective condition of the poor as a class rather than on specific and isolated issues.

Advocacy planning also coopts the professional advocate planner himself: it directs the dissident professional to expend his limited energies in a form of practice which gives him the satisfaction of working directly for the interests of deprived groups and of being involved in 'positive' action even though the results may be limited, and the process may be coopting and therefore detrimental to those interests.

Nonetheless, the practice of advocacy, limited as it is, has performed several positive functions, some of which I have already identified and are summarized below:

a. Advocacy planning can be effective in reforming bureaucracies such as social welfare agencies and city planning authorities, thus making them more responsive to local needs, exploiting available resources, and releasing funds (e.g. welfare checks, 236 housing, etc.) that were previously

withheld from the users.

b. It can successfully oppose plans such as new highways and Urban Renewal projects, that are detrimental to the interests of low income communities.

c. It can bring about certain changes on the national scale by exerting pressure, and expressing demands on a local level.

d. It has reformed the professions of architecture and planning by demythologizing the value neutrality of the plan and of technical skills, thus making the profession accountable to a previously ignored set of actors and to alternative values and goals.

e. It has provided us with an insight and valuable experience on the dynamics and the issues involved with a democratic organization of the planning process. The various advocacy planning projects provide us with models of how decisions could be taken collectively, and technical knowledge disseminated and questioned, in an ideal situation where matters of major social importance would be objects of our decision.

f. Finally, advocacy planning has had an unintended positive result. In its incapacity to implement any of its own community-plans, in spite of the very large amount of expended resources - time, skills, vocal protest, contacts, on the part of both the community and the planner, it serves as an excellent illustration of the inadequacies of existing programs. In assuming that services can be delivered without major structural reforms in the distribution of power and the relations of

production - the institutionalized decision mechanisms - advocacy planning has pushed and exploited the existing state and federal programs, and the judicial apparatus to their limits, thus exposing their inadequacies.

Alternatives

I have argued throughout this paper that political mechanisms of decision-making are inadequate for solving social problems. This is not because they lack adequate resources but because they are constrained by institutionalized mechanisms of decision-making. Insufficient resources to deal with urgent social problems is just a manifestation of the true function of politics. Resources are abundant when political mechanisms are used as an instrument of powerful interests.

The criticism of advocacy planning was based on the assumption, that I attempted to justify, that political institutions are not autonomous; but rather they are an appendage and a corrective mechanism to the economic institutions which decide most of the questions of major social importance.

The task, then, is to free politics from those constraints: to change and expand the role of political decisions and to bring the matters that are of major social importance under the control of purposive social action, of planning.

The emancipation of politics cannot happen by itself. Advocacy planning will be useful only if it helps in this process

of transformation. It must overcome the pluralist assumptions on the autonomy of politics. It must understand the limitations of politics imposed by the institutionalized constraints, and must manifest this understanding in its practice.

This is a particularly difficult task since, as I have argued, citizens perceive the institutionalized constraints as natural or given and hence they accept them and act rationally within them, by dealing with their objective conditions individually rather than collectively, except in situations where the inequalities produced by those institutions are so blatant that they become explosive.

Advocacy planning must develop an analysis, alternative to that of pluralism, that can adequately explain the nature of decision mechanisms, their consequences and what is needed to change them. Chester Hartman recommends that:

Advocate planners should have a clear political analysis of the way the system works as a whole and the way in which individual elements of the system relevant to their field operate: the housing market, urban renewal, the highway program, etc....

If the advocate planner's understanding of the situation leads him to analyze the system as a whole, it is his responsibility to frame his findings in broader systematic terms and to attempt to persuade the community that this analysis is correct. The action implications are, of course, quite different, depending on the analysis.

That analysis should lead to a consistent program of action.¹

Such an analysis will require a different strategy from that of pluralistic advocacy planning and will be reflected in a new practice, from the selection of issues and constituencies

to the use of resources and technical skills. I shall examine some of the issues involved with this new practice below.

A pluralist advocate planner would reject a point of view that emphasizes the political analysis, even though his own view necessarily implies an analysis. Marshall Kaplan, for example, states that:

The value system assumed by the planner need only be a basic humanism, a humanism concerned with expanding the choices of the poor as a priority imperative. Values or commitment should not be confused with ideology. Too often those with ideologies, whether of the right or left, use the poor rather than are used by the poor. Given the complex problems facing the poor, plans premised on ideologies are, at best, irrelevant and, at worst, harmful to the specific interests of the poor for they represent unreal, often misplaced, abstractions. As such they provide a weak base upon which to engage in the resource allocation process. Finally, the planning process engaged in by the ideologue must be, because of the nature of ideology, a deductive one, whereas complex ghetto problems require an inductive approach.²

Kaplan calls for a practice of advocacy that corresponds to the pluralistic model that I criticized earlier. He fails to recognize that his own position is ideological, that to follow that practice one must necessarily accept the pluralist assumptions on the nature of our institutions, and the limits of the possible outcomes of his actions.

As for the value system of "a basic humanism", no one would deny that they adhere to it. It is too general and emotive a phrase to serve as an adequate basis for action, and it has

been used in the past to justify widely disparate modes of action.

Kaplan's aversion for what he calls ideology, i.e. a political analysis that leads to a consistent program of action, points to a real problem: engaging in pluralistic advocacy planning, in the manner, for example, suggested by Kaplan, is either to identify problems of specific communities - clients - that are manifested in a concrete form, (e.g. the threat of an Urban Renewal Plan) or it is to translate the general and objective condition of a community into a series of concrete and rational demands that can be technically argued, and addressed to, and mediated in the existing and visible resource allocation-political process. The limitations of this process were explained above. Such a practice has the advantage of being rational, as opposed to utopian, in the sense of identifying problems in a way that they have a chance of being satisfied in the limited available opportunity structure. An approach that wants to overcome the limits of this pluralistic mode of action and attempts not only to mediate demands in the existing opportunity structure, but to expand that structure itself, is faced with the danger of seeming utopian - even though our society has the potential and the productive capacity to make it possible, once the institutionalized constraints are lifted.

A strategy, then, that confronts the task of changing the mechanisms of decision is faced with the danger of neglecting the specific issues and the concrete problems of the poor, fearing that their position will be coopted and thus favoring a grandiose scheme for social change that postpones gratification until "after the revolution". It is this type of strategy that alarms Kaplan.

A movement that wants to overcome pluralism and to be successful in organizing and politicizing, must also overcome utopianism; it must show how what is not possible now is not a natural state of affairs and can become possible in the future.

To develop strong community organization there is a need to produce concrete results. Otherwise, as Kaplan says, the analysis will remain "an empty abstraction". Community problems cannot be neglected for the sake of a long range strategy. Further, the concrete benefits that accrue to the poor from a successful strategy give credence to the viability of this strategy. This is something that pluralistic advocacy planning has obviously failed to achieve.

An alternative strategy, then, is faced with the dilemma of having to make a tradeoff between long range and short range goals. Using the limited resources to pursue only the former is dangerously utopian. Pursuing only the latter can lead to limited reforms only.

Can this dilemma be resolved in the practice of advocacy planning?

The task, in terms of the issues that advocacy planning is confronting, is to deal with issues that are not the results of political decisions (such as highway proposals and urban renewal plans), but also with issues that are results of institutionalized mechanisms - with objective conditions - and to try to challenge those mechanisms. Such issues cut across individual and isolated communities. The client, then, of advocacy would shift, from a particular public, to the public, the members of a social class. Alliances among different communities would be sought and demands could be presented on the national level. In such a case, technical skills would be used, not to restrict and to coopt demands, but to find new ways of presenting them, challenging the existing opportunity structure by showing the limitations of what can be achieved within it.

The most lucid example of this type of practice will be found in advocacy projects opposing highway plans.

In the Inner Belt and the South-West Expressway controversy, in Cambridge and Boston, the advocates moved away from the specific issue of the adverse effect of the location of the highways on the local communities and, without neglecting it, they challenged the whole process of decision-making on transportation. They claimed that

political decisions - public expenditure on highways - were favoring the interests of commuters, the car and oil industry, and the builders. They challenged the institutionalized constraint of resolving the transportation problem through individual consumption - cars and highways - in favor of a collective model - mass transit - that has redistributive implications.

"Who was now the advocate's client?", asks Lisa Peattie:

(The advocate) was speaking for people... unaware of themselves as constituting an interest group, and unaggregated in any particular social unit or institution...he was speaking for institutional restructuring, and its opposite model now appeared not so much that of the lawyer defending an indigent client as that of the radical political action group?

The task of restructuring institutions is not easy. But a first step for the advocate planner is to reject the pluralist assumptions that limit the scope of his practice.

APPENDIX

The discussion of advocacy projects is based on knowledge through readings (see bibliography) and discussions of various projects in the area and elsewhere, as well as on personal experience.

In the last four years I have worked in four community projects in a role that could be described as an advocate planner. One of them involved the opposition to a civic center in the Roxbury section of Boston consisting of a court house, a police station and a library.

In this case, my own position was to try to persuade the client group that more could be achieved by opposing the whole proposed complex - including the police station and the court house, and that the concerned group's role should be to mobilize the community around the issue. The community, though, took a moderate stand. They decided to accept the court house and the police station and to advocate the expansion of the program for the library to encompass many functions related to community needs. The plans that I produced were instrumental in persuading the city that an expanded program was possible on the site. The city accepted the modified program in exchange for ensuring the implementation of the court house and the police station. Two years after my involvement with the group had ended - successfully, for what their objectives were, and what they were expecting

from me - I received a call from the Black Panther Party expressing indignation at the fact that a conspicuous police station was built in the heart of the black district, and asking for details of the situation. Construction work on the court house and the police station has since been completed, but it has not begun on the library.

A second project involved the rehabilitation through community resources, abandoned or BRA-owned housing in Bosont's South End, as part of CAUSE's program for community organization and community development.

A third project is a classic case of urban renewal conflict in Lynn, Massachusetts. The Urban Renewal Program of Lynn had dislocated the larger part of 4,500 working class large-sized families and had flattened a large area in the center of Lynn. The place, of the single family houses that were demolished, was to be taken by multi-family predominantly one and two bedroom high rise apartment houses. The objectives of the plan were to provide the residential basis of the diversification of the General Electric plant facilities - General Electric is the major employer in the area - to convert the urban renewal area into a middle class sleeping suburb for the Boston Metropolitan area, and to upgrade the property of powerful real estate interests through the use of federal funds. No adequate housing for the displaced large families exists in the area and the city had not submitted any relocation plans - required by law - although it had received a large part

of the federal government matching funds. The City Hall and the local newspaper were totally indifferent to the interests and demands of the community. The Citizens for a Better Lynn and other community organizations - although they took an active role after much of the demolition was completed - successfully blocked implementation of the plan through court action asking for a referendum on the bond issue. The advocate planners provided information showing how the land disposition documents did not adequately cover the housing needs of the large families in the neighborhood. In the last elections the mayor and many of the members of the city council were voted out of office.

Finally, in 1970-71, I was involved in a project in Holyoke, Massachusetts. In the previous year a group of students and faculty from Harvard (Urban Field Service) and MIT was contacted by a community group on a matter the community was urgently, directly and adversely affected by. The Master Plan for the City of Holyoke which had just been completed, had designated the South City area (Ward II) composed largely of working class French Canadian Americans, as an industrial park forbidding any further investment in the residential life of the community.

The Harvard-MIT group produced a report - a result of a detailed study of the community - which argued against the Master Plan recommendations for South City. The team found the community to be stable, to have a beneficial relationship

with the surrounding industry and argued that the Master Plan recommendations virtually condemned to decay a residential community of 60 densely built acres, by blocking any investment in the residential use of the area and opening the way for the Urban Renewal bulldozer. The report called for a variance of the Master Plan.

The residents, immediately threatened by the Master Plan, gathered all the political power at their disposal, and with the MIT-Harvard report at hand, they got the Holyoke City Council to revise its 1968 Master Plan by deleting from it all references to the proposed reorganization of their ward for purely industrial purposes.

Our group was then asked to develop plans for the rehabilitation of the neighborhood. We worked closely with the leaders of the local storefront organization which was our contact with the community and which we helped incorporate, opening the membership to the entire community. But this local corporation was democratic and open only in its structure since the larger community failed to participate. The only active participants were the local politicians, aldermen and established leaders of the neighborhood: people who received personal gratification from participating. So, beyond the plan that we produced there was no other resource that could be utilized. In the first phase of the project, when MIT helped in making the changes in the Master Plan, community interest and participation was substantial. This interest

disappeared in the second phase.

In this phase, we identified certain problems of the community, such as lack of adequate municipal services, insufficient playgrounds and open space facilities, traffic problems and most importantly deterioration, blight, and need for overall improvement and rehabilitation. Although active community participation was absent, we felt that our identification of problems was adequate and would have met with approval from the neighborhood. On the basis of this we developed an idealized plan for the community, of needed services and of rehabilitation work that needed to be done. If our work had stopped there the result would have been a utopian projection without practical value to the community. No action could be taken on its basis and it would only have served as a way to raise the hopes of the clients without the benefit of informing them of how the goals of that plan could be pursued and attained and thus frustrating their own desires and hopes. The next phase therefore was to superimpose on this idealized plan a new one that translated those goals into a series of target areas for which we developed detailed plans and identified the possible sources of funds available in city, state and federal programs, and courses of action the community might take to achieve implementation. This second stage of the project has not been as successful as the first.

Several factors - mistakes and shortcomings on our part as planners - could account for this failure. Factors beyond our control are explained in the main body of this thesis.

- We could be blamed for not actively soliciting community participation and support for this stage of the project, or for not pushing the development plan at the time the community was already mobilized (when immediately threatened by the Master Plan).

- We could be blamed for our lack of adequate skills and adequate contacts (the two are practically inseparable since adequate skills means ability to manipulate available resources) with both government programs and private financiers. This is definitely a possibility although we did actively pursue funding possibilities from state programs (MHFA) with vague promises as a result. But even if our skills and contacts were more adequate there are few things that we could have achieved in the Holyoke project: the first would have been to compete with other communities and put pressure on various state (MHFA) and federal government programs to contribute from their limited funds in the rehabilitation of the neighborhood.

The second avenue would have been to rely on market mechanisms and persuade private financiers that the condition of the neighborhood did indeed make it worth their while to invest in it. Over this second avenue we had no control as

planners. The conditions of the neighborhood that determine such things as investment are set by institutional mechanisms that the plan cannot control.

CHAPTER ONE

1. The debate on "Whom Does the Advocate Planner Serve?" in Social Policy, vol. 1, numbers 1 and 2.
2. With apologies to Abraham Kaplan who has coined the term for use in a quite different context. See his The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science, Chandler Publishing Co., San Francisco, 1964.
3. R. P. Wolff uses this analogy in his The Poverty of Liberalism.
4. Paul Davidoff, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning" in H. W. Eldredge, Taming Megalopolis, Doubleday Anchor, New York, 1967. p. 599
5. S. M. Lipset, Political Man, Anchor Paperback, p. 403.
6. For a more detailed account of the philosophical origins of pluralism see Robert Wolff, The Poverty of Liberalism, Beacon, Boston, 1968, Chapter 3.
7. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Schocken, New York, 1968.
8. Robert Michels, Political Parties, republished by Dover, New York, 1959.
9. Daniel Bell, "Notes on the Post-Industrial Society" in Survey, Spring 1971, p. 24.
10. ibid. p. 24
11. Daniel Bell, "The Community Revolution" in The Public Interest.
12. Statement by MIT lawyer Ed Hanify, quoted in Gordon Fellman, "Brief History of the Inner Belt Issue in Cambridge" in Hans Spiegel, (ed.) Citizen Participation in Urban Development, Vol. II, NTL Institute for Applied Behavioral Science, Washington, D.C. 1969, p. 203.
13. Karl Polanyi, "Our Obsolete Market Mentality", in Dalton (ed.), Primitive, Archaic and Modern Economics: Essays of Karl Polanyi, Doubleday, New York, 1968 pp. 60-61 (emphasis in the original).
14. Stephen Marglin, The Origins and Functions of Hierarchy in Capitalist Production, preliminary draft, Harvard University, February 1971.

15. *ibid.*, pp. 4-5.
16. Cf. among others, Paul Blumberg, Industrial Democracy, Schocken, New York, 1970, and Seymour Melman, "Industrial Efficiency Under Managerial vs. Cooperative Decision-Making in Israel", in The Review of Radical Political Economics, vol. 1, number 2.
17. In fact, as I shall argue in later chapters many more issues that affect our environment that are now left to the chaotic determination of market forces and unequal distribution of power must become part of our conscious and purposive decision-making processes.

CHAPTER TWO

1. Sources will be identified where possible or relevant. The terminology for my formulation is borrowed from Herbert Gintis, "Contre-culture et Militantisme Politique" in Les Temps Modernes, February 1971.
2. Robert Wolff, *op. cit.*, pp. 86-92.
3. ibid., p. 90.
4. The argument that the interests of the entrepreneur have been superceded by the rise in power of a techno-structure which operates on quite different basis (cf., Galbraith, The New Industrial State, Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology, and the original, Burnahm, The Managerial Revolution, among others) will be briefly discussed below.
5. Another institution is the division of labor, although as I will subsequently claim this could be treated under the institution of centralized control.
6. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Book IV quoted in Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy and the Crisis of Public Authority, Norton & Co., New York, 1969, pp. 4-5
7. The following descriptive analysis of pluralism is based on Robert Dahl, Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American City, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1961. Seymour Marlin Lipset, *op. cit.*, Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1956, David Truman, The Governmental Process,

Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1962, Banfield and Meyerson, Politics, Planning and the Public Interest, Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare, Harper and Row, New York, 1953, Nelson Polsby, Community, Power and Political Theory, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1963, Domhoff and Ballard (ed.), C. Wright Mills and the Power Elite, Beacon Press, Boston, Mass., 1968, Lawrence D. Mahn, "Studies in Community Decision-Making," reprinted in Kramer and Specht, Readings in Community Organization Practice, Prentice-Hall, New York, 1969. Critical studies consulted: C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, Oxford University Press, New York, 1957, Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," The American Political Science Review, LVI, December, 1962, pp. 947-952, Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism, Norton, New York, 1969, Paul Rogin, The Intellectuals and McCarthy, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1967, Paul Wolff, op. cit., Todd Gitlin, "Local Pluralism as Theory and Ideology," in Current Sociology, no. 1 (Dreitzel, ed.), MacMillan Co., New York, 1969, originally published in Studies on the Left, vol. 5, number 3, 1965, from which all references are drawn.

8. Such factors have been oft-chronicled. The summary below is drawn from Lowi, op. cit., Wolff, op. cit., and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding, The Free Press, New York, 1970.
9. Quoted in Michel Rogin, op. cit., p. 35.
10. Lowi, op. cit., p. 43.
11. Rogin, op. cit., p. 275.
12. Wolff, op. cit., p. 127.
13. Lowi, op. cit., p. 45.
14. Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties, the Free Press, New York, 1960, and S. M. Lipset, Political Man, Doubleday and Co., New York, 1960.
15. Arthur Schlesinger quoted in Martin Rein, Social Policy: Issues of Choice and Change, Random House, 1970, p. 331.
16. Lipset, op. cit., p. 406.
17. Bell, The End of Ideology, p. 119.

18. All above quotations from Daniel Bell: "Technocracy and Politics" in Survey, Spring, 1971, pp. 20-22. This is a revised version of his "The Post Industrial Society," in The Public Interest, numbers 6-7, 1967-8.
19. ibid., p. 23
20. The view that impersonal forms of corporate property such as "the technostucture" has been substituted for direct private ownership (cf. the most potent analysis of Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State) has not been left unchallenged. The debate is too long to be summarized here (cf. among others, Norman Birnbaum, The Crisis of Industrial Society, Oxford University Press, New York, 1969, Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society, Basic Books, New York, 1969, and Andre Gozz, Strategy for Labor, Beacon Press, Boston, Mass., 1968.)
21. In another article, for example, Bell argues that the problem we are facing is not how to give an effective voice to the poor, but rather that we are faced with "a babel of voices". Daniel Bell and Virginia Held, op. cit., p. 142.
22. Lowi, op. cit., p. 45.
23. Dahl and Lindblom, op. cit., p. 4.
24. ibid., p. 3.
25. Wolff, op. cit., p. 128.
26. Polsby, op. cit., p. 128.
- 27.
28. Dahl, Who Governs?, p. 225.
29. Nelson Polsby, quoted in Bachrach and Baratz, op. cit., p. 947.
30. ibid.
31. ibid., p. 950.
32. A similar theme is developed in Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, Beacon Press, Boston, Mass., 1967.

33. Lowi, op. cit., pp. 51-53.
34. Dahl, op. cit., p. 316-17.
35. See for example, Samuel Bowles, Contradictions in U.S. Higher Education (draft), Harvard University, 1971, and Herbert Gintis, "Education and the Characteristics of Worker Productivity," in American Economic Review, May, 1971.
36. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," in Domhoff and Ballard, op. cit., p. 33.
37. Gittlin, p. 36.
38. Wolff, op. cit., p. 110.
39. J. E. Meade, Efficiency, Equality and the Ownership of Property, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1965, p. 38.
40. Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, Monopoly Capitalism, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1965, Chapter 6, and below.
41. R. L. Warren, "Types of Purposive Social Change at the Community Level," in R. M. Kramer and Harry Specht, op. cit.
42. Gintis, "Contre-culture...", pp. 1407-9.
43. ibid.
44. Lowi, pp. 61-62.
45. Cf. Baran and Sweezy. op. cit., especially chapters 6 and 7. "The uses to which government puts the surplus which it absorbs are narrowly dircumscribed by the nature of monopoly capitalist society and as time goes on become more and more irrational and destructive", p. 142. Also the debate on "Is Imperialism Necessary?" by S. M. Miller et. al., and Harry Magdoff, Social Policy, number 3, 1970. Related is the current debate on conversion and technology transfer.
46. Cf. Michael Walzer, "Politics in the Welfare State," in Dissent, January-February, 1968, p. 27.
47. Kenneth Kenniston, "A Second Look at the Uncommitted", in Social Policy, July/August, 1971, vol. 2, number 2, pp. 6-19.

48. In practice then, pluralism exhibits these strong ideological evaluations. In an important study on the alleged relationship of populist mass movements to McCarthyism, Michel Rogin presents the argument that pluralism deliberately assumes that the two movements are related, that McCarthyism appealed to the same social groups as did 'left-wing' Populism." Rogin's study proves that there is no empirical justification for such correlation. The reason pluralism presents such a view is to pose group politics, political moderation, tolerance and consensus as alternatives to irrationality, ideology, abstract moral judgment and radicalism, which are values associated with mass movements. (Rogin, op. cit., especially chapters 1 and 9). Similar positions have been taken more recently by pluralists with respect to the student movement and the black unrest (cf. Leo Ribuffo, "Pluralism and American History" in Dissent, June 1971, pp. 272-278, and Kenneth Keniston, op. cit.).
49. Quoted in Rogin, op. cit., p. 17.
50. ibid., p. 14.
51. Dahl, op. cit., p. 95.
52. ibid., p. 85.
53. Dahl, op. cit., p. 93.
54. Rogin, op. cit., p. 25.
55. The view that scientific knowledge provides a canon for the mastery of society is not new. Its historical origins lie with the Enlightenment and the positivism that came out of it. The positive sciences then played a truly liberating and revolutionary function in their ability to challenge the repressive order of the church and of the feudal state. A failure though to see their role as historical leads to the current misunderstanding. This is accentuated by the fact that the view of objective ("dialectical") knowledge as a canon for the regulation of society was adopted by a certain form of popular Marxism as developed and exemplified in some of the writings of Lenin (intellectual vanguard and party as the guide of the party) and later in the Bolshevik state. This attitude leads to a self-serving and ideological function of the sanctity of the technical intelligentsia thesis which has been amply discussed and exposed. (Cf., among others, Alasdair MacIntyre, "The End of the End of Ideology",

in MacIntyre, op. cit., and Noam Chomsky, "Objectivity and Liberal Scholarship" in Chomsky, American Power and the New Mandarins, Pantheon, New York, 1969. Chomsky argues that even if the thesis that the technical intelligentsia is in the process of taking over decision making processes is true, there is no cause for jubilation: "Quite generally, what grounds are there for supposing that those whose claim to power is based on knowledge and technique will be more benign in their exercise of power than those whose claim is based on wealth or aristocratic origins? On the contrary, one might expect the new mandarin to be dangerously arrogant, aggressive, and incapable of adjusting to failure, as compared with his predecessor, whose claim to power was not diminished by honesty as to the limitations of his knowledge, lack of work to do, or demonstrable mistakes", p. 27.

CHAPTER THREE

1. Matthew Edel, Development or Dispersal? Approaches to Ghetto Poverty (mimeo.), Laboratory for Environmental Sciences, MIT n.d.
2. Daniel R. Fusfield, "The Basic Economics of the Urban and Racial Crisis", in Conference Papers of the Union of Radical Political Economists, December 1968, p. 58.
3. Charles Silberman, quoted in Edel, op. cit.
4. Cf. Matthew Edel, "Urban Renewal and Land Use Conflicts", in The Review of Radical Political Economics, vol. 3, number 3, Summer 1971, pp. 76-88.
5. ibid., p. 80.
6. op. cit.
7. Report of the National Commission on Urban Problems, House Document, number 91-34, pp. 110, 111, 163.
8. I. L. Horowitz, Power, Politics, and People: The Collected Essays of C. Wright Mills, Oxford University Press, New York, 1967, p. 400.
9. "Where is architecture going?", the American Institute of Architects Journal, March 1968, pp. 43ff.

10. Comment on Ethics, The American Institute of Architects Journal, January 1968, pp. 56-57.
11. Title of Article in the American Institute of Architects Journal, April 1970.
12. "The Future of the Profession", op. cit., p. 48.
13. Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1971, Report of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, U.S. Senate Report, number 92-331, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1971, pp. 23-3, my underline.
14. Stephen Cohen, "From Causation to Decision: Planning as Politics", in The American Economic Review, vol. LX number 2, May 1970, p. 184. See also his Modern Capitalist Planning: The French Model, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971, and Charles Bettelheim, Studies in the Theory of Planning, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1961.
15. ibid., p. 184
16. Quoted in "Advocacy Planning", in Progressive Architecture, September 1968, pp. 103-104.
17. Davidoff, "Advocacy and Pluralism", p. 598.
18. Robert Dahl, Who Governs?, pp. 307-309.
19. Davidoff, op. cit., p. 609.
20. ibid., p. 604, my underline.
21. ibid., p. 599.
22. George Brager and Valerie Jorin in their "Bargaining: A Method in Community Change," Social Work, October 1969, pp. 73ff. provide a useful typology of the strategic uses of power resources of a community, suggesting that bargaining mechanisms must be institutionalized "to challenge and counteract other formal organizations, as a means by which individuals may be protected from official inequity."
23. Piven, Social Policy, vol. 1, number 1, p. 35.
24. Edmund Burke, "Citizen Participation Strategies," in AIP Journal, September 1968, p. 292.

25. Blecher, op. cit., p. 155.
26. Peattie, op. cit., p. 238.
27. ibid., p. 603-604.
28. ibid., p. 602.
29. ibid., p. 603.
30. Earl M. Blecher, Advocacy Planning For Urban Development, Praeger, New York, 1971, p. 167.
31. Davidoff, op. cit., p. 602.

CHAPTER FOUR

1. Remarks of Davidoff in the Proceedings of National Conference on Advocacy and Pluralistic Planning, Urban Research Center, Hunter College, New York, 1969, p. 22.
2. ibid., p. 21.
3. ibid., p. 23.
4. ibid., p. 24.
5. ibid., p. 150.
6. Proceedings, Introduction by Seymour Mann, p. viii.
7. Piven, op. cit.
8. Kramer, op. cit.
9. Lee Shostak, On the Practice of Advocacy Planning, unpublished MIT paper, 1970, based on the study; Earl Blecher, op. cit.
10. Cf. among others, Shery Arnstein, "A Ladder of Citizen Participation", in the Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 35., number 4, July 1969, pp. 216-224, and Melvin Mogulof, "Coalition to Adversary: Citizen Participation in Three Federal Programs, ibidem. pp. 225-232, and Edmund Burke, "Citizen Participation Strategies", in the American Institute of Planners Journal, September 1968, pp. 287-294.

11. Cf. Harold Goldblatt, "Arguments For and Against Citizen Participation in Urban Renewal", in Hans Spiegel (ed.), op. cit., vol. 1., pp. 31-42, and Elliot Krause, "Functions of a Bureaucratic Ideology; 'Citizen Participation'", in Social Problems, vol. 16, number 2, Fall 1968, pp. 129-142.
12. See Marris and Rein, Dilemmas of Social Reform, Atherton, New York, 1967.
13. Cf., Moynihan, op. cit., Chapter 3 and Marris and Rein, op. cit., Chapter 1.
14. Cloward and Elman, "Advocacy in the Ghetto," in Progressive Architecture, December 1966, p. 30.
15. Lowi, op. cit., p. 243.
16. The use of participation as a technique in social integration, manipulation, and persuasion, as well as a way of making control and production more efficient has been amply discussed in various management theories (Scanlon plan, theory "Y", etc.). Eugene Litwak has made the point, using cases from industrial bureaucracies and local communities, that social control is maximized by the coordination of bureaucratic and primary groups: "Mature bureaucratic centralization leads to an explicit effort to coordinate and use formal organizations and local primary groups to maximize social control because the formal organization provides expertness and breadth of coverage but is inflexible and unable to deal with non uniform events. The primary groups provide flexibility and ability to deal with the unanticipated, but has little expertness or breadth of coverage. Where these two groups can be coordinated then maximal control is achieved, i.e., expertness breadth of coverage and flexibility." (in Litwak: Voluntary Association and Neighborhood Cohesion in American Sociological Review, April 1961, p. 271.) Similarly Martin Oppenheimer suggests that new participatory models imposed by management (as with the CAP) usually limit participation to decisions that exclude "the most important segment of the job, namely the content of product, while attempting to create a dealienating situation by democratizing the form or process.... In short, the democratic enterprise has to exist within an imperial system, and in fact helps to maintain that system" (in Oppenheimer: Participative Techniques of Social Integration in Our Generation, vol. 4, number p. 8.) See also Blumberg, op. cit.

17. Bertram M. Beck, "Community Control: A Distraction Not an Answer," in Social Work, October 1969, pp. 18-19.
18. Frances Fox Piven, "Whom Does the Advocate Planner Serve?" in Social Policy, vol. 1, number 1, May/June 1970, pp. 33-34.
19. A House Democrat as reported in "New York Times", quoted in Moynihan, op. cit., p. 154.
20. From a report in Barron's National Business and Financial Weekly on the Third Socialist Scholars Conference, quoted in ibid., p. 149.
21. Parts of this memo have been published in Earl M. Blecher, Advocacy Planning for Urban Development, Praeger Special Studies in U.S. Economic and Social Development, New York, 1971, pp. 17-19.
22. ibid., p. 18.
23. ibid., p. 19.
24. Edelson and Kolodner, "Are the Poor Capable of Planning for Themselves?" in Speigel (ed.) op. cit., p. 237.
25. Sherry R. Arnstein, "But Which Advocate Planner", in Social Policy, July/August 1970, p. 33.
26. Peattie, op. cit., p. 241.
27. Proceedings, pp. 145-146.
28. Peattie, op. cit., p. 245.
29. Moynihan, op. cit., p. 25.
30. Davidoff and Reiner, "A Choice Theory of Planning", in the Journal of the American Institute of Planners., vol. 28, number 2, p. 108.
31. Davidoff, in Proceedings....., p. 35.
32. This statement was made by 2MJQ, a black, militant advocacy planning organization in Harlem, quoted in "Advocacy Planning", in Progressive Architecture, September 1968, p. 104.

33. Davidoff, ibid., p. 35.
34. Paul and Linda Davidoff, "Advocacy Planning Polarizes the Issues", in Social Policy, July/August, 1970, p. 34.
35. Perlman and Jones, Neighborhood Service Centers, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Development, Washington, D.C., 1967.
36. Peattie, op. cit., p. 246-247.
37. ibid., p. 242.
38. ibid., p. 247.
39. Roland Warren, "Model Cities First Round: Politics, Planning, and Participation", in Journal of the American Institute of Planners, July 1969, p. 252. Warren's statement is in the context of the Model Cities experience.
40. Cf. Jurgen Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, Beacon Press, Boston, Massachusetts, 1971, Chapters 5 and 6.
41. See Brooks, Michael P., Social Planning and City Planning, Planning Advisory Service Report, number 261, American Society of Planning Officials, Chicago, 1970, p. 40.
42. Proceedings of the Conference on Advocacy..., pp. 135-136.
43. Remarks by Samuel Dardick, ibid., p. 52.
44. Piven, op. cit., p. 35.
45. ibid., p. 34.
46. Piven, "Who Does the Advocate Planner Serve?", unpublished version of the Social Policy article, n.d., p. 14.
47. Sumner Rosen, "Sumner Rosen Comments" in Social Policy, vol. 1, number 1, p. 36.
48. Marshall Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 270-271.
49. Sumner Rosen, op. cit., p. 36.
50. See e.g., Robert Goodman, After the Planners, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1972, pp. 23-24, 171-173.

51. Proceedings, p. 64.
52. Cf. Cloward, Richard and Elman, "Advocacy in the Ghetto", in Progressive Architecture, December 1966, pp. 27ff.
53. Richard Cloward and Frances Piven, op. cit.
54. Cf. Michael Stone, op. cit.
55. Martin Rein, Social Policy, p.332

CONCLUSIONS

1. Chester Hartman, "The Advocate Planner: From Hired Gun to Political Partisan", Social Policy, July/August 1970, p.38.
2. Marshall Kaplan, op. cit. p.271
3. Lisa Peattie, op. cit. pp.247-248

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